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Rethinking Standards of Appellate Review
ADAM N. STEINMAN*
Every appellate decision typically begins with the standard of appellate review. The
Supreme Court has shown considerable interest in selecting the standard of
appellate review for particular issues, frequently granting certiorari in order to
decide whether de novo or deferential review governs certain trial court rulings. This
Article critiques the Court's framework for making this choice and questions the
desirability of assigning distinct standards of appellate review on an issue-by-issue
basis. Rather, the core functions of appellate courts are better served by a single
template for review that dispenses with the recurring uncertainty over which
standard governs which trial court decisions.
The error-correction role of appellate courts would be optimized by a unified
inquiry into whether the appellate court's likelihood of reaching the correct decision
is higher than the trial court's. This new standard would consider both general
institutional advantages (such as the trial court's superior ability to assess witness
credibility) and case-specific indicia of correctness (such as the appellate court's
level of confidence or particular strengths or weaknesses in the trial court's
analysis). This inquiry can be joined with the Supreme Court's long-standing view
that appellate courts may always correct legal errors de novo, regardless of the
broader standard of review that applies to a particular issue. That power to correct
legal errors, combined with the ability to identify conditions that increase or
decrease the likelihood that a court's decision on a particular issue is correct, would
enhance the law-clarification function of appellate decisions.
Accordingly, this Article argues for a unform approach to appellate review that
permits reversal only when (a) the trial court committed an error of law, or (b) the
appellate court's likelihood of reaching the correct decision is higher than the trial
court's. These two components eliminate the need to track particular issues for either
de novo or deferential review at the front end, allowing appellate courts to discard
the Supreme Court's problematic doctrine on standard-of-review selection while still
serving the systemic goals of error correction and law clarification.
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INTRODUCTION
When appellate courts issue decisions, their analysis usually begins with the
standard of appellate review.1 Briefs filed in the federal courts of appeals must
1. For a sampling of published appellate decisions from the first weeks of 2020, see, e.g.,
Paez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 651 (11th Cir. 2020) ("We review a district
court's decision to take judicial notice of a fact for abuse of discretion. We also review a
district court's decision to sua sponte raise the statute of limitations for abuse of discretion."
(citation omitted)); Murphy-Sims v. Owners Ins. Co., 947 F.3d 628, 631 (10th Cir. 2020)
("Where an appellant challenges a particular jury instruction, we review the district court's
decision to include or exclude that instruction for abuse of discretion."); L.F. v. Lake Wash.
Sch. Dist. #414, 947 F.3d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 2020) ("A grant of summaryjudgment is reviewed
de novo."); Taha v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020)
("The dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) warrants de novo review."); BP Expl. &
Prod., Inc. v. Claimant ID 100354107, 947 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2020) ("This court applies
an abuse-of-discretion standard to the district court's refusal to review a final award under the
Settlement Program."); Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2020) ("We
review the denial of a motion for reconsideration under the deferential abuse of discretion
standard."); Roe v. Dep't of Def., 947 F.3d 207, 219 (4th Cir. 2020) ("We review the decision
to grant or deny a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion."); Grand Canyon Tr. v.
Bernhardt, 947 F.3d 94, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ("We begin our analysis by resolving the parties'
dispute over our standard of review . . . . The agencies' view is that the question of causation
is reviewed only for clear error. The agencies are correct.") Hobbs v. Petroplex Pipe & Constr.,
Inc., 946 F.3d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 2020) ("Because the district court resolved this case following
a bench trial, we review the district court's historical findings of fact for clear error."). See
generally HARRY T. EDWARDS, LINDA A. ELLIOTT & MARIN K. LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW, at x (2d ed. 2013) (describing standards of appellate review as "critically important
in determining the parameters of appellate review and in allocating authority between trial
courts ... and the appellate bench").
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contain "a concise statement of the applicable standard of review." 2 Frequently,
however, there is no statute or rule that dictates the standard of appellate review for
the myriad issues that appellate courts must address. In such cases, federal courts
determine the standard of review on their own.
Often the Supreme Court itself grants certiorari for the express purpose of
determining the standard of appellate review for particular issues.3 The Court has
been called upon to decide the standard of review for issues such as whether to
impose sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;4 whether an
officer had reasonable suspicion or probable cause for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment;5 whether to enforce a subpoena from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission;6 whether to order a new trial or remittitur based on an
excessive punitive-damages award;' whether a punitive damage award is grossly
excessive for purposes of the Due Process Clause;' whether the forfeiture of property
to the government is grossly disproportional under the Excessive Fines Clause;9
whether to award attorney fees under section 285 of the Patent Act;1 whether a
creditor is a non-statutory insider for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code;" whether a
federal right was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity;1 2 where a
child's "habitual residence" is for purposes of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction; 3 whether to award enhanced amages in
a patent case;14 determinations of state law questions in a diversity action;15 whether
the government's litigation position was substantially justified for purposes of
awarding a plaintiff attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act;16 and factual
disputes relating to construction of a patent claim.? Once selected, that standard
governs both circuit-level appellate courts and the Supreme Court. 18
2. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(B); see also id. 28(b)(4) (requiring every appellee's brief to
provide a "statement of the standard of review" if "the appellee is dissatisfied with the
appellant's statement").
3. See infra notes 4-17 and accompanying text.
4. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 403-05 (1990).
5. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-700 (1996).
6. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166-70 (2017).
7. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279-80
(1989).
8. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431-40 (2001).
9. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 & n.10 (1998).
10. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563-64 (2014).
11. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 965-68 (2018).
12. Elderv. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994).
13. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 730-31 (2020).
14. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934-36 (2016).
15. Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-39 (1991).
16. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557-63 (1988).
17. TevaPharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836-40 (2015).
18. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001)
(holding that a de novo standard of review applies to whether a punitive damage award is
grossly excessive for purposes of the Due Process Clause); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (applying the de novo standard); see also Cooper v.
2020] 3
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Through this line of decisions, the Supreme Court has identified a range of
considerations for deciding whether federal appellate courts should apply a de novo
standard (plenary review) or a deferential standard (such as clear error or abuse of
discretion) to particular trial court rulings.19 Although scholars have examined and
critiqued certain features of existing doctrine on standards of appellate review,20 they
have not challenged the basic factors that ostensibly guide the selection of the
standard of review for particular issues. This Article critically examines those factors
and argues against selecting standards of review on an issue-by-issue basis.
One misguided feature of the Supreme Court's current approach is its view that
the standard of appellate review should be selected based on the ability of an
appellate decision to clarify the law on a given issue. Indeed, the Court has given
contradictory instructions about he relationship between the standard of appellate
Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465 (2017) (applying a clear error standard of review to the district
court's finding that race was the predominant factor in the drawing of two legislative districts
in North Carolina).
19. To be clear, this Article's focus is the standard of review that appellate courts apply
to trial court rulings. This standard of appellate review is distinct from standards that govern
judicial review of acts by legislatures, see, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S.
450, 459 (1988) (noting "strict scrutiny," "heightened scrutiny," and "the standard rational
relation test" as potential "standard[s] of review" for legislative classifications), or
administrative agencies, see, e.g., Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2569 (2019)
(describing the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious standard" as a
"deferential" and "narrow" standard of review (citations omitted)); Mayo Found. for Med.
Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 58 (2011) (describing Chevron deference as "the
appropriate standard of review" for certain agency actions).
20. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional
Rights Cases, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1185 (2013); George C. Christie, Judicial Review of
Findings ofFact, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 14 (1992); Martha S. Davis, Standards ofReview: Judicial
Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47 (2000); Henry J.
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747 (1982); Carissa Byrne Hessick &
F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2008);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Standard of Appellate Review for Scientific Evidence: Beyond
Joiner and Scheffer, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 340 (1999); Evan Tsen Lee, Principled
Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions
Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 251 (1991); Martin B. Louis, Discretion or Law: Appellate
Review of Determinations That Rule 11 Has Been Violated or That Nonmutual Issue
Preclusion Will Be Imposed Offensively, 68 N.C. L. REv. 733 (1990); Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 235 (1985); John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134
U. PA. L. REv. 477, 478 (1986); Jonathan Remy Nash, Unearthing Summary Judgment's
Concealed Standard of Review, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 87 (2016); Chad M. Oldfather,
Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308 (2009); Robert C. Post, The
Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REv. 169; Maurice Rosenberg,
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635 (1971);
Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review
in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998); Kenji Yoshino, Appellate Deference in the
Age of Facts, 58 WM. & MARY L. REv. 251 (2016); Rebecca Silver, Comment, Standard of
Review in FOIA Appeals and the Misuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 731, 757
(2006); Note, Mixed Questions ofLaw and Fact, 110 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1996).
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review and law clarification. Some decisions indicate that an issue should be
reviewed de novo if it "entails primarily legal ... work"-that is, if it will "require
courts to expound on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a broad
legal standard";21 by contrast, deferential review should be selected for an issue that
will hinge on "multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist
generalization,"2 2 and for which it is "impracticab[le] [to] formulat[e] a rule of
decision."23 In other contexts, however, the Court has stated that de novo review is
necessary to clarify the law precisely because an issue is "not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."2
This tension may reflect the reality that the standard of appellate review does not
meaningfully affect the law-clarifying benefits of an appellate decision. The
Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that appellate courts may correct legal
errors de novo even when they are applying a deferential standard of review to a
particular issue.25 In this sense, an appellate court's ability to clarify the law in a
given area is not restrained at all by the selection of a deferential standard of review
for that issue; nor is it especially empowered by the selection of a de novo standard
of review for that issue.26 What ultimately makes a difference from a law-
clarification standpoint is not the standard of appellate review but rather how the
appellate court writes its opinion.27
The Supreme Court's current framework does recognize one important
consideration. In inquiring whether the trial court or the appellate court is "better
positioned" to decide a given issue,28 it indicates that the standard of appellate review
should be chosen with an eye toward reducing the systemic likelihood of error. But
the current approach fails to explore fully the relationship between the standard of
review and the error-correction function. On one hand, de novo review might best
accomplish this goal, since it would maximize the ability of appellate courts to
correct trial court mistakes. On the other hand, vesting de novo review in a worse-
positioned appellate court could increase the likelihood that the appellate court would
mistakenly reverse a correct trial court decision. Deferential review might address
this latter concern, but the Court has failed to provide meaningful guidance on how
deferential appellate review should operate in practice29-raising questions about
whether it strikes the proper balance.
The considerations that currently drive the choice between deferential and de
novo review are better served by a unified template for appellate review: for any
21. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018).
22. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561-62 (1988)).
23. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 363 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561-62).
24. Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 232 (1983)).
25. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
28. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166-67 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559-
60).
29. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
2020]
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given appeal, the appellate court should inquire whether its likelihood of reaching
the correct decision is higher than the trial court's likelihood of reaching the correct
decision.30 This inquiry would incorporate both (1) general institutional
advantages-for example, the trial court's superior ability to assess witness
credibility-and (2) case-specific indicia of correctness-such as the appellate
court's level of confidence or particular strengths or weaknesses in the trial court's
analysis.31 This Article's approach would also retain the prevailing notion that
appellate courts may correct all legal errors de novo.32 But absent an identifiable
legal error by the trial court, an appellate court should review trial court decisions
through the lens of this comparative-likelihood-of-correctness standard.33
This approach will enhance both the error-correction and law-clarification
functions that appellate courts serve.3 4 Regarding the former, it is unproductive to
slot issues for deferential or de novo review at the front end-based on whether trial
courts are "better positioned" than appellate courts to decide a particular issue as a
general matter-because the way to optimize systemic accuracy is via the more
targeted, back-end question of whether the appellate court or the trial court is more
likely to be correct in this particular case.35 That inquiry will necessarily take into
account any general advantages or disadvantages each court may have.
This Article's approach will also empower and encourage appellate courts to
clarify the law. Appellate courts may continue to address questions of law de novo.
But even beyond such legal issues, this Article's unified standard will require
appellate courts to identify conditions that increase or decrease the likelihood that a
court's decision on a particular issue is correct.3 6 These would include the
generalized institutional characteristics that currently inform the selection of the
standard of review for particular issues, as well as case-specific features of a
particular decision that either increase or decrease the likelihood of correctness.37
Moreover, this Article's approach would incentivize more thorough decisions by trial
courts, because the standard provides a tangible benefit for trial judges who render
decisions in ways that exhibit a high likelihood of correctness.38 For both trial courts
and appellate courts, therefore, this approach to appellate review would play a
valuable information-forcing role.39
30. See infra Part II.
31. As explained infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text, this approach would not
require the appellate court to calculate with mathematical precision the accuracy rates of it and
the trial court. Rather, it provides a framework for conceptualizing considerations that already
inform appellate review.
32. See infra note 147 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV (proposing a more
precise understanding of which legal issues would be categorically subject to de novo review).
33. See infra Part III.
34. See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 2006)
("Error correcting and lawmaking are the core appellate functions.").
35. See infra Section III.A.
36. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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This Article also develops a sensible definition of what constitutes the kind of
legal error that appellate courts may always address de novo (under both this
Article's proposal and the Supreme Court's current approach).4 Distinguishing pure
"legal" issues from other matters is a problem that has bedeviled courts and
commentators in a variety of different contexts.1 This Article argues that the legal-
error exception should apply only with respect to generalizable legal principles. This
notion can be workably defined as propositions that can be expressed in the form "If
A then B."4 2 At some point, of course, the appellate court will run out of such
generalizable principles; the outcome will hinge simply on whether A or Not-A is
correct. As to that decision, systemic accuracy is maximized by allowing the
appellate court to reverse the trial court only when its likelihood of being correct
exceeds that of the trial court.4 3 Accordingly, an appellate court would never have de
novo authority to reverse the trial court solely because it disagrees with the trial
court's decision. The appellate court must either identify a generalizable principle
that was overlooked by the trial court, or it must explain why it is more likely to be
correct than the trial court in that case.
To propose a unified approach to appellate review is not to suggest that the
considerations underlying existing standards of appellate review are unimportant.
Rather, these concerns are too important to be relegated to the sort of abstract,
threshold inquiry that the current approach requires. The existing framework
misguidedly tries to address the key appellate functions of law clarification and error
correction by tracking issues for either de novo or deferential review at the front end.
A better approach is to make these considerations part of a unified approach to
appellate review that informs the substantive merits of every appellate decision.
This Article concludes, however, by addressing areas where the Supreme Court
has suggested a specialized approach to appellate review. Specifically, the Court has
indicated that certain trial court rulings that typically arise in constitutional litigation
may warrant de novo review regardless of the functional considerations that
dominate its general approach to standards of appellate review.4 4 Although the Court
has yet to clarify the scope of or justification for such distinctive treatment, this
Article considers one possible rationale: that the costs of error may be asymmetric
for some issues. Perhaps the erroneous rejection of a constitutional claim or defense
(the under-enforcement of constitutional rights) is a more costly error than the
erroneous grant of a constitutional claim or defense (the over-enforcement of
constitutional rights).45 The Supreme Court has yet to consider this possibility, and
concern about asymmetric error costs does not currently form any part of the Court's
general approach to selecting the standard of appellate review for particular issues.
Although this Article does not comprehensively examine the problem of asymmetric
error costs, it identifies several ways to account for such asymmetries within the
context of the unified approach proposed here.46
40. See infra Part IV.
41. See infra note 199.
42. See infra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
44. See infra Section V.A.
45. See infra notes 251-62 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
2020] 7
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes and criticizes the Supreme
Court's current approach to selecting the standard of appellate review for particular
issues. Part II develops a model to assess the relationship between the standard of
review and the judicial system's ability to avoid errors, showing how appellate
review can be deployed to improve systemic accuracy even as to issues for which the
trial court has a higher general likelihood of correctness than the appellate court.
Part III uses this insight to develop a unified approach to appellate review that does
not require tracking particular issues for either de novo or deferential review at the
front end. Part IV proposes a way to refine the "legal error exception"-the rule that
legal questions may always be reviewed de novo-that will avoid overuse by
opportunistic appellate courts. Part V addresses the current confusion regarding
appellate review of certain issues relating to constitutional claims and defenses, and
examines the possibility of specialized approaches to appellate review for issues
where the costs of error are asymmetric.
I. WHY DOES THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW MATTER?
Over the last several decades, the Supreme Court has issued a long line of
decisions on how to select the standard of appellate review for particular issues.4 7
Although there are a range of different "verbal formulas" for various standards of
review,48 the most important distinction is between de novo review (plenary or
independent review) and deferential review (such as a clear-error or abuse-of-
discretion standard).4 9 Even when a deferential standard is chosen for a particular
issue, the appellate court may correct any errors of law independently, without
deference as to those legal issues.50 Accordingly, the selection between de novo
47. See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text.
48. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) ("[T]here are
more verbal formulas for the scope of appellate review ... than there are distinctions actually
capable of being drawn in the practice of appellate review.").
49. See Sch. Dist. of Wis. Dells v. Z.S. ex rel. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir.
2002) (Posner, J.) ("[T]he cognitive limitations that judges share with other mortals may
constitute an insuperable obstacle to making distinctions any finer than that of plenary versus
deferential review."); see also Boyd, 55 F.3d at 242 (noting that the distinction between de
novo review and deferential review "is a feasible, intelligible, and important one"); Oldfather,
supra note 20, at 313-14 (describing the distinction between de novo review and "more limited
standards of review, such as for abuse of discretion, where the reviewing court's role is
restricted to determining whether the lower court's ruling fell within some zone of
permissibility"). Butcf Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 735 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring)
(arguing that a district court's determination of a child's "habitual residence" under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction should be reviewed for
"abuse of discretion" rather than the majority's standard of "clear error" but recognizing that
"[a]s a practical matter, the difference may be no more than minimal"); KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW 43-44 (2013) (suggesting three standards-de novo review,
clear-error review, and an especially heightened level of deference requiring "almost-certain
error").
50. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 968 n.7 (2018) (adopting a clear-error standard of review but noting that "an
appellate court must correct any legal error infecting a [lower] court's decision" and that an
9 [Vol. 96:1
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review and deferential review matters only with respect to errors that are not legal
errors.51
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court began to embrace a functional, policy-
oriented approach to choosing the standard of appellate review for particular issues.52
Its analysis has focused on two of the key roles that appellate courts play. The first
is law clarification.5 3 The second is error correction.54
These functional considerations are not necessarily the entire picture. The Court
has at times indicated that historical practice might suggest a particular standard of
appellate review for a particular issue.55 And it is possible that positive-law rules,
statutes, or even constitutional provisions will dictate-or at least provide textual
clues about56-the intended standard of review. Federal Civil Rule 52, for example,
states that a district court's "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."5 With respect to jury trials,
the Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amendment "controls the allocation of
authority to review verdicts" between trial courts and appellate courts,58 holding that
the Seventh Amendment required a deferential standard of appellate review when a
trial court denies a motion for a new trial based on an ostensibly excessive verdict.59
Even when the Court has undertaken such inquiries, however, it has often found
appellate court "should apply de novo review" to such a legal error); McLane Co. v. EEOC,
137 S. Ct. 1159, 1168 n.3 (2017) (noting that an abuse-of-discretion standard "does not shelter
a district court that makes an error of law"); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)
("[A]n abuse-of-discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate
correction. A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.");
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 402 (1990) (noting that an abuse-of-discretion
standard "would not preclude the appellate court's correction of a district court's legal errors");
see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982) ("[I]f a district court's findings
rest on an erroneous view of the law, they may be set aside on that basis."); Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 448 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]o
the extent the inquiry is 'legal' in character, there is little difference between review de novo
and review for abuse of discretion."). For a critique of the notion that legal errors should be
categorically subject to de novo review, see Oldfather, supra note 20, at 310-11.
51. Because the treatment of legal errors is the same regardless of the selected standard
of review, what qualifies as a "legal error" is not the primary focus of this Article. And as
explained in Part III, this Article's proposal would retain the current rule that legal errors are
reviewed de novo on appeal. In Part IV, however, I propose one way to define and implement
the legal-error exception.
52. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-63 (1988) (selecting a deferential
standard of appellate review based on what "soundjudicial administration counsels"); see also,
e.g., McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1168-69 (discussing "functional considerations" and "functional
concerns" that favored an abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing a district court's decision
to enforce an EEOC subpoena).
53. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
55. See McLane, 137 S. Ct. at 1166.
56. See, e.g., Highmark Inc. v. Allcare HealthMgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 564 (2014).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
58. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humans., Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996).




either that they provide no independent guidance,60 or that such inquiries merely
bolster the Court's policy-based assessment of the relevant functional
considerations.61
The Supreme Court's recent decision in U.S. Bank has refined the inquiry
somewhat.62 Justice Kagan's opinion distinguished between three components of any
given lower court ruling: "the first purely legal, the next purely factual, the last a
combination of the other two."6 3 The first of these-the "legal test" or the "standard"
that governs a particular issue-is an "unalloyed legal ... question[]" that an
appellate court reviews de novo, "without the slightest deference."64 In the second
category are questions of "'basic' or 'historical' fact," which address "who did what,
when or where, how or why." 65 Such purely factual questions are subject to
deferential review.66 The final component is "the so-called 'mixed question' of law
and fact"-that is, "whether the historical facts found satisfy the legal test chosen. "67
It is for such "mixed questions" that functional considerations come into play.68
This Part critically examines the extent to which the selection of the standard of
appellate review affects the functional considerations the Supreme Court has
identified. As explained below, the Court's approach does not fully appreciate the
relationship between the standard of review and the ability of appellate courts to
clarify the law.69 There is a plausible connection between error correction and the
standard of appellate review, but that relationship demands a fuller account than the
Court has provided.70
60. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. At
Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 967 n.3 (2018).
61. See, e.g., Highmark, 572 U.S. at 564.
62. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 965-68.
63. Id. at 965.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 966. See also Monaghan, supra note 20, at 235 (describing "[f]act identification"
as "a case-specific inquiry into what happened here" including "who, when, what, and where"
(emphasis omitted)).
66. See U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 966 ("By well-settled rule, such factual findings are
reviewable only for clear error-in other words, with a serious thumb on the scale for the
[lower] court." (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 966-67. This framing does not meaningfully affect the overall approach
described here. Because of the legal-error exception discussed above, questions of law relevant
to any particular issue must be reviewed de novo, even when a deferential standard is selected
for that issue. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. And none of the issues to which
the Supreme Court has applied its standard-of-review selection framework constitute
questions of "historical fact." See supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text (summarizing
issues for which the Supreme Court has designated a particular standard of appellate
review); cf infra notes 222-45 and accompanying text (describing the current confusion
regarding "constitutional facts" and "legislative facts," which the Court has yet to examine
through the lens of its current framework). As a practical matter, then, it makes no difference
whether an issue is first characterized as a mixed question before inquiring into which
standard of appellate review should apply as a matter of judicial policy.
69. See infra Section I.A.
70. See infra Section I.B.
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A. Law Clarification
An important role that appellate courts play in our system is to clarify the
substantive content of the law through their decisions in particular cases.>1 As
Professor Philip Kurland put it nearly half a century ago, this "lawmaking function"
is "the genius of the common law system that we inherited from our English
forbears."7 2 The Supreme Court has stated that the choice of the standard of review
for any given issue should consider the appellate court's law-clarification role. But
it has provided conflicting accounts of the relationship between the standard of
appellate review and law clarification.
One strand of case law instructs that choosing the standard of review should
depend on whether the appellate court's resolution of the issue "entails primarily
legal or factual work." 73 A question that will "require courts to expound on the law,
particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal standard" should typically
be reviewed de novo.7 4 But a deferential standard should apply to questions that will
"immerse courts in case-specific factual issues-compelling them to marshal and
weigh evidence, make credibility judgments, and otherwise address what we have
(emphatically if a tad redundantly) called 'multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow
facts that utterly resist generalization."'7 5 The "impracticability of formulating a rule
of decision" for such an issue is a significant factor in favor of deferential appellate
review.76
71. See, e.g., Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously,
95 YALE L.J. 62, 69-70 (1985) (noting "the law-making function of an intermediate appellate
court"); Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the
Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOwA
L. REv. 871, 894 (1983) (noting that courts of appeals "are also charged with ... contributing
to the explication of federal law"); Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 616, 618 (1974) (describing
appellate courts' "lawmaking function of creating and amending rules of law, not only so that
they may be followed by the lower courts within the system, but also to provide guidance to
lawyers and their clients as to the propriety of their behavior, their obligations, their duties,
their rights, and their remedies"); Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of
Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751, 779 (1957) ("Everyone agrees, so far as I know, that
one function of an appellate court is to discover and declare-or to make-the law.").
72. Kurland, supra note 71, at 618; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.").
73. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967; see also id. (noting that de novo review should apply
"when applying the law involves developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other cases");
Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 730 ("[T]he appropriate standard of appellate review for
a mixed question depends on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work."
(quoting U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967) (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted)).
74. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967.
75. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561-62 (1988)); see also Pierce, 487
U.S. at 561-62 (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 662-63).
76. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561 ("One of the 'good' reasons for conferring discretion on the
trialjudge is the sheer impracticability of formulating a rule of decision for the matter in issue."
(quoting Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 662)); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 363 (2007)
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Another line of Supreme Court decisions suggests a different relationship between
standards of appellate review and law clarification. It posits that de novo review
might be needed to clarify the law in exactly those situations where a particular issue
is "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."7 Some concepts
"cannot be articulated with precision" and therefore "take their substantive content
from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed."78
Nondeferential review may be required so that appellate courts can "maintain control
of, and clarify, the legal principles."7 9
These two visions are irreconcilable. If one accepts the view that case-by-case, de
novo appellate adjudication clarifies the law for issues that are "not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules," 0 surely one should also welcome such
clarification in the face of "multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly
resist generalization."81 The reality, however, is that the standard of appellate review
does not change the court's capacity to clarify the law. As described above, legal
errors warrant appellate correction even under a deferential standard of review.82
Accordingly, a deferential standard would not restrict an appellate court's ability to
"expound on the law, particularly by amplifying or elaborating on a broad legal
standard."8 3 Where a trial court decision is contrary to law-as that law is
independently identified by the appellate court-reversal is permitted even under
deferential review.
Nor can it be presumed that only de novo review is capable of providing case-by-
case legal clarification. In one recent case, the Supreme Court held that the trial
court's decision to award enhanced amages in a patent case must be reviewed for
abuse of discretion.84 The Court did not view deferential review as an obstacle to
clarifying when such enhanced amages were appropriate. To the contrary, the Court
praised the fact that appellate review under a deferential standard had "narrowed"
the "channel of discretion"85 and had "given substance to the notion that there are
limits to that discretion."86 Even under deferential review, the appellate court must
determine the metes and bounds of the space within which trial courts may operate.
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("A second factor that we found significant was the impracticability
of formulating a rule of decision .... "); see also McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1167
(noting that the decision whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena is "case-specific" and does
not turn "on a neat set of legal rules" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
77. Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at
232).
78. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (quoting
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696).
79. Id. (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697). This notion also seems to inform the Supreme
Court's admittedly inconsistent treatment of certain constitutional issues. See infra notes 219-
31 and accompanying text.
80. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96.
81. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561-62); see supra note 75
and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
83. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967.
84. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016).
85. Id. at 1932 (quoting Friendly, supra note 20, at 772).
86. Id. at 1934.
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Whether the appellate court ultimately approves or disapproves of a particular trial
court decision, it can shed light on what is legally permissible going forward.
In short, what makes a difference from a law-clarification standpoint is not the
standard of appellate review but rather how the appellate court writes its opinion in
any given case. An appellate court might choose to issue a summary decision with
no substantive reasoning whatsoever.87 Or it might issue an unpublished opinion that
lacks precedential effect.88 That such decisions are rendered under a de novo standard
of review will not magically imbue such decisions with law-clarifying benefits.89
This is not to suggest that appellate courts should be obligated to provide broad
guidance beyond the precise facts of a particular case. Some commentators, for
example, have extolled the virtues of "judicial minimalism,"90 recognizing that
maximalist decisions can impose heightened system costs in two ways. First, they
entail additional "decision costs" because it takes greater effort to craft an opinion
that will clarify what the law requires across a broader sweep of future cases.91
Second, they risk additional "error costs," because a mistaken decision will adversely
affect a larger universe of future cases.92 There are, of course, arguments in favor of
more maximalist appellate decision-making.93 The point here is simply that a de novo
standard of review does not by itself bring about law-clarifying appellate decisions.
87. See, e.g., Von Germeten v. Planet Home Lending, LLC, No. 19-2459, 2020 WL
469883, at *1 (7th Cir. Jan. 10, 2020); Grant v. U.S. Dep't of Def., No. 18-5308, 2019 WL
668086, at * 1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2019). Although such summary decisions are typically issued
when appellate courts affirm the trial court's decision, there are some examples of summary
reversals as well. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Interiorv. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., No. 91-1583, 1993
WL 71706 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 1993) (granting summary reversal because "[t]he merits of the
parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action").
88. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 32.1.1(a) ("Rulings by summary order do not have precedential
effect."); 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b) (providing that decisions rendered as "Orders" are "not published
in the Federal Reporter, and are not treated as precedents"); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) ("Unpublished
dispositions and orders of this Court are not precedent ... ."). See generally Merritt E.
McAlister, "Downright Indifference": Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal
Courts ofAppeals, 118 MICH. L. REv. 533, 542-67 (2020) (describing the use of unpublished
decisions in federal appellate courts). Appellate courts use unpublished opinions even when
reversing a trial court decision. See, e.g., McCalmont v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 677 F. App'x
331 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversing the district court in an unpublished memorandum opinion);
Love v. WEECOO (TM), 774 F. App'x 519, 520-22 (11th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district
court in an unpublished per curiam opinion).
89. See, e.g., Meyer v. Pfeifle, 790 F. App'x 843, 843 (8th Cir. 2020) (issuing a
nonprecedential, unpublished opinion while applying a de novo standard of review); Porter v.
Uhler, 790 F. App'x 329, 329 (2d Cir. 2020) (same); Swallow v. Torngren, 789 F. App'x 610,
611 (9th Cir. 2020) (same); United States v. Smith, 798 F. App'x 473, 475 (11th Cir. 2020)
(same).
90. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
91. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4, 16-
18 (1996).
92. Id. at 18-19.
93. See, e.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (2009).
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Conversely, a deferential standard of review will not hinder an appellate court that
is prepared to "expound," "amplify[]," and "elaborat[e]" on the law.94 Again,
deferential review gives the appellate court free rein to correct errors that run afoul
of the appellate court's understanding of the governing law.95 And even if the
appellate court does not explicitly invoke the exception that allows for de novo
review of legal errors, it may still provide law-clarifying guidance in examining a
trial court decision under a deferential standard.96
Finally, there is a fundamental conceptual flaw in the current framework's inquiry
into law clarification. The court selecting the standard of appellate review must
ultimately speculate about whether future decisions on a particular issue will "entail[]
primarily legal ... work"97 (such as the development of a "neat set of legal rules"98)
or, in the alternative, hinge on "multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that
utterly resist generalization."99 Those questions are ones that an appellate court
should address on the merits of any particular appeal-not as part of a hypothetical
assessment of how future appellate courts will behave. The Court's recent U.S. Bank
decision, for example, considered the standard of review for whether a transaction
had been "conducted at arm's length" for purposes of federal bankruptcy law.0
Concluding that a deferential clear-error standard should apply, the Court reasoned
that applying the "arm's-length test"-that is, assessing whether the transaction had
been "conducted as though the two parties were strangers"-would require
"[p]recious little" legal work. 1 The Court observed that prior decisions "have never
tried to elaborate on the established idea of a transaction conducted as between
strangers."10 2 Rather, "[t]he stock judicial method is merely to state the requirement
of such a transaction and then to do the fact-intensive job of exploring whether, in a
particular case, it occurred."0 3 There was "no apparent need to further develop
'norms and criteria,' or to devise a supplemental multi part test, in order to apply the
familiar term." 4
The problem with this sort of analysis is that the overarching legal standards-the
"norms and criteria," or the need for a "supplemental multi-part test""'-are
questions that the appellate court should address on the merits. An issue may appear
"fact-intensive" to the court that is selecting the standard of review, but a court
considering the merits of future cases may believe that generalizable "norms and
94. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018).
95. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
97. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967.
98. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
99. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 967 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561-62
(1988)).
100. Id. at 965.
101. Id. at 962, 967-69.
102. Id. at 968.
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criteria" are warranted. Would that scenario require a retroactive change to the
standard of review?l06 The Court's approach puts the cart before the horse by
requiring courts to predict in the abstract whether more generalized rules are justified
or desirable without considering the actual merits of such rules.
For all of these reasons, the current framework's examination of how the standard
of review would affect the appellate court's capacity to clarify the law is misguided.
Law clarification ultimately comes from the substance of an appellate court's
opinion, which will either clarify-or not clarify-the law regardless of the standard
of appellate review.
B. Error Correction
Perhaps the most direct function that appellate courts serve is to correct errors by
trial courts.107 For purposes of selecting the standard of appellate review, this error-
correction role drives the Supreme Court's consideration of "[d]ifferences in the
institutional competence of trial judges and appellate judges"108 as to a particular
issue; the choice should examine whether, "as a matter of the sound administration
of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question."109 Current case law, however, has yet to fully explore the relationship
between the standard of appellate review for any given issue and error correction.
One might argue that de novo review would best serve the appellate courts' error-
correction function, because a de novo standard would maximize the ability of
appellate courts to correct trial court mistakes." A deferential standard of review,
by contrast, could require the appellate court to tolerate errors that might have been
corrected under a de novo standard. A more complete understanding, however, must
account for the possibility that the appellate court will make a mistake. If the
appellate court mistakenly reverses a correct trial court decision, then appellate
review has created error.
106. To be clear, as explained supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text, an appellate court
could declare such norms and criteria de novo even when a deferential standard of review
governs a particular issue. But that only bolsters this Article's earlier point that the standard
of appellate review does not affect a court's ability to clarify the law in such a way. See supra
notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 71, at 69 ("Why do we have appeals in the first place?
Among the more compelling answers to that question are that appellate courts exist to correct
errors .... "); Edwards, supra note 71, at 894 ("The courts of appeals, unlike the Supreme
Court, are intended to serve as courts of error .... "); Kurland, supra note 71, at 618 (noting
that one function that appellate courts perform is "that of correcting erroneous decisions
rendered by judicial tribunals inferior to it in the judicial hierarchy").
108. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001).
109. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166-67 (2017) (quoting Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60); see also DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS:
STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 222 (2d ed. 2006) ("In some
circumstances, it has been believed, the trial judge is in a better position to make a correct
decision than are appellate judges even though there normally are three appellate judges and
only one trial judge.").
110. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Replay, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1683, 1699 (2011) (noting
the argument that "de novo review might correct more mistakes").
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Indeed, there are some issues for which the trial court may be more likely to be
correct than the appellate court. For example, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that trial courts have an advantage when evaluating the credibility of live witness
testimony because "the various cues that 'bear so heavily on the listener's
understanding of and belief in what is said' are lost on an appellate court later sifting
through a paper record."I It has also observed that a trial court may be better
positioned with respect to particularly complex disputes, because they are able to
develop greater familiarity with the relevant issues while presiding over "the entirety
of a proceeding," as compared to "an appeals court judge who must read a written
transcript or perhaps just those portions to which the parties have referred." 2 The
Court has made a similar point regarding certain criminal sentencing decisions,
noting that "the district court must make a refined assessment of the many facts
bearing on the outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in
criminal sentencing."113
To illustrate this point more generally, consider a scenario where the trial court is
90% likely to be correct, but the appellate court is only 80% likely to be correct." 4
If no appeal is allowed, then the systemic likelihood of correctness is simply the trial
court's likelihood of correctness (90%). If de novo review is allowed, then the
appellate court will displace the trial court's ruling in those cases where they
disagree. Accordingly, the aggregate likelihood of correctness will be the appellate
court's likelihood (80%). The following table unpacks this model in more detail:
111. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1474 (2017) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)).
112. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 327 (2015) (noting that patent
law requires "familiarity with specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained
in the general storehouse of knowledge and experience" and that "[a] district court judge who
has presided over, and listened to, the entirety of a proceeding has a comparatively greater
opportunity to gain that familiarity than an appeals court judge who must read a written
transcript or perhaps just those portions to which the parties have referred" (quoting Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950))).
113. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
114. In developing this illustration, I am cognizant that using mathematical probabilities to
assess accuracy in the legal system can be problematic. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael
S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107
(2007); D. Michael Risinger, Reservations About Likelihood Ratios (and Some Aspects of
Forensic 'Bayesianism '), 12 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 63 (2013). And I do not mean to suggest
that one could measure with precision the likelihood that one court or another will reach the
correct result, or that one could even know with confidence whether a "correct" result was
reached in any given case. This model can, however, illuminate the practical consequences of
appellate review under certain assumptions. See also infra Part II (modeling deferential
appellate review).
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Table 1: De Novo Review Despite the Appellate Court's
Lower Likelihood of Correctness
Trial court is correct Trial court is incorrect
(90%) (10%)
Appellate court is Box 1: Correct result Box 2: Correct result
correct (80%) Appellate court affirms a Appellate court reverses an
correct trial court decision incorrect trial court decision
[72% of all cases]15  [8% of all cases]
Appellate court is Box 3: Incorrect result Box 4: Incorrect result
incorrect (20/o) Appellate court reverses a Appellate court affirms an
correct trial court decision incorrect trial court decision
[18% of all cases] [2% of all cases]
The aggregate likelihood of reaching the correct result in Table 1 is the sum of
Box 1(72% of all cases) and Box 2 (8% of all cases).11' This is precisely the appellate
court's likelihood of correctness (800%), which is a worse accuracy rate than the trial
court standing alone (90%).117 One can emphasize the point by focusing on Box 2
and Box 3-the two situations where the appellate court disagrees with the trial court.
In the universe of cases where they disagree, the appellate court is wrong nearly 70%
of the time.18
This admittedly simple model illustrates the intuitive notion that de novo review
will reduce the likelihood of correctness in cases where the trial court is more likely
to be correct than the appellate court. This insight justifies the current inquiry-as
115. For ease of illustration, this model assumes that the trial and appellate court's accuracy
rates in any given case are not correlated. Mathematically, this means that the likelihood of
each outcome is simply the product of the component probabilities. For example, the
likelihood that both courts reach the correct outcome (Box 1) is the product of the appellate
court's likelihood of being correct and the trial court's likelihood of being correct (.90 x .80 =
.72).
116. For another 2x2-grid depiction of the relationship between trial courts and appellate
courts, see Dalton, supra note 71, at 76. Professor Dalton modeled party satisfaction in these
four possible outcomes, arguing that the only outcome with positive party satisfaction is the
appellate court correctly reversing an incorrect trial court decision. See id. The appellate
court's affirmance of a correct trial court decision, he argued, was a negative outcome in terms
of party satisfaction because, in that situation, the trial court had reached the correct result so
an appeal was unnecessary. See id. at 77 ("If the trial judge has gotten it right, what advantage
is there in an appeal?"). This is an important and valuable insight regarding the potential costs
and benefits of a right to appellate review, but it addresses a different issue than systemic
accuracy, which is the focus of this Article's model.
117. To be clear, the hypothetical accuracy rates of 90% and 80% are chosen purely for
illustrative purposes. The same overall result-that de novo review reduces systemic accuracy
when the trial court is more likely to be correct than the appellate court-obtains regardless of
the exact numbers.
118. Boxes 2 and 3 represent 26% of all cases, with Box 2 (trial court correct) representing
18% of all cases and Box 3 (appellate court correct) representing 8% of all cases. The trial
court is correct 69.2% of the time they disagree (.18 + .26), and the appellate court is correct
30.8% of the time they disagree (.08 + .26).
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described above119-into the relative "institutional competence of trial judges and
appellate judges"120 and whether the trial court or the appellate court is "better
positioned ... to decide the issue in question."12 1 For issues where the trial court has
a greater likelihood of correctness than the appellate court, the error-correction
function is not well served by a de novo standard of review.
Whether deferential review is a more desirable alternative, however, is less clear.
On one hand, it might be argued that appellate review should be denied entirely for
issues where the trial court has a greater likelihood of correctness; why would we
ever want to displace the judgment of the more accurate institution? On the other
hand, it could be argued that a deferential standard of review paints with too broad a
brush, perhaps impeding appellate courts from correcting trial courts whose
performance in a particular case does not match the prediction of greater accuracy
that prompted the selection of a deferential standard to begin with.
It is hard to assess whether deferential review strikes the right balance because
the Supreme Court has shed remarkably little light on what sort of deference
deferential appellate review requires. Consider the "clearly erroneous" standard.122
The Supreme Court has stated that clear-error review entails "a serious thumb on the
scale" in favor of the lower court's decision123-reversal requires "the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."" But how heavy a "thumb" is
required? How "definite and firm" must the conviction be? As Professor Ed Cooper
put it: "[T]he 'clearly erroneous' phrase has no intrinsic meaning. It is elastic,
capacious, malleable, and above all variable."1" The same could be said of appellate
119. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
120. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 440, 440 (2001).
121. McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1166-67 (2017) (quoting Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559-60 (1988)).
122. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .... "); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel.
CW Cap. Asset Mgmt, LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 963 (2018) (holding
that "a clear-error standard should apply" to the question of "whether the person's transactions
with the debtor (or another of its insiders) were at arm's length").
123. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 966; see also Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465 (2017)
("[W]e may not reverse just because we 'would have decided the [matter] differently."
(alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985))).
124. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see also Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (calling U.S. Gypsum a "seminal decision" on
the clear-error standard); Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1465 ("A finding that is 'plausible' in light of
the full record-even if another is equally or more so-must govern." (quoting Anderson, 470
U.S. at 574)). One federal judge offered the following gloss on clear-error review: "[A]
decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must, as one member
of this court recently stated during oral argument, strike us as wrong with the force of a five-
week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish." Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d
228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
125. Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 645 (1988); see also STEVEN ALAN
CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, 1 FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.01 (4th ed. 2010)
("Carroll's Humpty Dumpty reveals what appellate specialists soon realize: word meaning
oftenboils down to the fact of power and expertise ratherthan a theory of natural significance."
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review for "abuse of discretion," which Judge Henry Friendly called a "verbal coat
of many colors."126 By what metric is an appellate court to measure what constitutes
"abuse"?
Ultimately, one cannot assess in isolation the connection between the standard of
appellate review and error correction. If one is depending on deferential review to
limit the ability of appellate courts to substitute their judgment as to issues for which
they are comparatively less accurate, more clarity is needed regarding precisely what
sort of deference is required.
This Part reveals that two of the rationales the Supreme Court has identified for
choosing between deferential and de novo review for any particular issue are
misguided. The standard of appellate review bears only the most attenuated
connection to law clarification. There is a plausible argument that the standard of
review can affect the error-correction function-as discussed above, de novo review
might undermine the goal of correcting error as to issues for which the trial court has
a higher accuracy rate than the appellate court.1 2 ' But the optimal approach to
appellate review as to such issues is unclear. The next Part explores how a deferential
standard of review might improve the systemic likelihood of reaching correct results,
coming to the surprising conclusion that the optimal application of deferential
appellate review supports a unified approach that does not demand an ex ante
assessment of whether the trial court or the appellate court is relatively better
positioned with respect to any given issue.
II. OPTIMIZING ERROR CORRECTION
Although there is a plausible connection between the standard of appellate review
for a particular issue and the judicial system's effectiveness in correcting errors
regarding that issue, the precise relationship between the standard of review and error
correction has yet to be carefully explored. On one hand, issues for which the trial
court may be "better positioned" to reach the correct result should require some
deference by the appellate court. Otherwise, we risk a worse-positioned appellate
court displacing the judgment of a better-positioned trial court. On the other hand,
there remains uncertainty about how deferential review is supposed to operate,
calling into question whether such deferential review reduces systemic error. 128
(citing LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, Ch. VI (1872))); Borgmann, supra
note 20, at 199-200 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has not provided detailed guidance as
to what makes a finding 'clearly erroneous"' and that "[b]oth courts and commentators have
criticized the 'clearly erroneous' standard as murky and malleable").
126. Friendly, supra note 20, at 763 (quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines,
344 U.S. 33, 39 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 659
(arguing that "the phrase 'abuse of discretion' ... does nothing by way of offering reasons or
guidance for the future" and "does not communicate meaning").
127. See supra Table 1, notes 114-18, and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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This Part develops a model to better understand how deferential review can
optimize systemic accuracy in cases where-as a general matter-the trial court is
more likely to be correct than the appellate court. As explained below, the basic test
should be that the appellate court should reverse where characteristics of the
particular case on appeal override the institutional advantages the trial court might
otherwise possess as a general matter. Such characteristics could include an
especially high level of confidence by the appellate court (a "definite and firm
conviction," 29 as the Supreme Court has described in the context of clear-error
review). They could also include problematic aspects of the trial court's reasoning
that indicate a higher-than-usual ikelihood of error by the trial court.130
This insight may seem straightforward, but it has a surprising corollary. If the key
inquiry is the appellate court's and trial court's comparative likelihood of correctness
in a particular case, then there is no need to slot issues for either deferential review
or de novo review at the front end. Both the generalized institutional advantages that
might inform the selection of the standard of appellate review and the case-specific
factors that would affect the application of that standard of review can form a
uniform template for appellate review.
Put another way, if the appellate court will have to weigh both its and the trial
court's institutional and case-specific advantages when applying a deferential
standard of review, what is gained by designating an issue for deferential review in
the first instance? That comparative assessment is optimal from an error-correction
standpoint regardless of whether-as a general matter-the trial court or the
appellate court is "better positioned."13 1 This recognition paves the way toward a
unified approach to appellate review-which is further developed in Part III-that
does not require an issue-specific assessment of whether that issue should be subject
to either de novo or deferential review.
Recall the earlier model, which assumed that-for a particular issue-the trial
court is 90% likely to be correct, but the appellate court is only 80% likely to be
correct.13 2 As described above, allowing de novo review would displace the trial
129. See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1474 (2017) ("[W]e reverse only when
'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."' (quoting
Andersonv. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985))).
130. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 455-56 (2009) (finding that shortcomings in
the district court's analysis in refusing to modify an injunction under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)
constituted an abuse of discretion); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111 (1996) (finding
an abuse of discretion because the district court based its decision to depart from the
Sentencing Guidelines on an improper consideration); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,
344 (1988) (finding an abuse of discretion because the district court "failed to consider all the
factors relevant to the choice of a remedy under the [Speedy Trial] Act"); Gemini Tech., Inc.
v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 931 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 2019) ("The district court did not
consider Gemtech's public policy argument under factor (2) [of the governing legal
framework]. This failure was an abuse of discretion.").
131. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
132. As mentioned above, I am aware of the shortcomings of models that assign
mathematical probabilities to particular outcomes in the legal system. See supra note 114.
They can, however, illuminate concepts that already drive the selection and application of
standards of review-for example, the notions that the trial court may be "better positioned"
than the appellate court to decide an issue, see supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text,
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court's higher likelihood of correctness with the appellate court's lower likelihood
of correctness-the systemic accuracy rate would be 80% .133 It would be better to
deny appellate review entirely; in that situation, the trial court's 90% accuracy rate
would be the systemic accuracy rate.134
For deferential appellate review to make sense from an error correction
standpoint, it would have to improve upon the trial court's superior accuracy rate.
But is it possible to increase the systemic likelihood of correctness by allowing an
appellate court with a lower likelihood of correctness (80%) to displace the judgment
of a trial court with a higher likelihood of correctness (90%)? Yes, if the appellate
court accounts for the fact that some cases may have characteristics that upset the
general expectation regarding which court has a higher likelihood of correctness.
That is, the appellate court may have a case-specific likelihood of correctness that is
higher than its average likelihood of correctness. Or the trial court may have a case-
specific likelihood of correctness that is lower than its average likelihood of
correctness.
Focus first on variance inherent in the appellate court's likelihood of correctness.
Using the example above, the appellate court's 80% average accuracy rate may
include some cases where its likelihood of being correct is more than 80% and other
cases where the likelihood is less than 80%. One might conceptualize the "definite
and firm conviction" required to reverse under a clear-error standard as covering
those cases where the appellate court believes its likelihood of correctness is higher
than usual. But how much higher than usual should the appellate court's case-specific
likelihood of correctness be to justify reversal under a deferential standard?
Optimally, reversal should occur when the appellate court's case-specific likelihood
of correctness is higher than the trial court's likelihood of correctness.
One can illustrate this point by expanding on the model above. Table 2 (below)
assumes the following: In 25% of cases the appellate court is confident enough that
it has a 95% likelihood of being correct. (One might think of these cases as those
where the appellate court would deem it to be clearly erroneous to reach a contrary
result.) In the remaining 75% of cases, however, the appellate court has only a 75%
likelihood of being correct. On average, the appellate court has the same 80%
likelihood of being correct as in the simpler model. 135 Under the standard of review
proposed here, the appellate court may reverse the trial court only in those cases
where it has the higher likelihood of being correct. The following table shows the
possible outcomes:
and that reversal under a deferential standard requires a higher level of certainty than might
justify reversal under a de novo standard, see supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text
(describing the requirement that reversal under a clear-error standard requires a "definite and
firm conviction"). Assuming different hypothetical levels of accuracy is one way to explore
the practical consequences of these variations. See also infra notes 141-44 and
accompanying text (explaining why the normative insights of this quantitative model would
not require courts to deploy mathematical calculations in practice).
133. See supra Table 1, notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
134. See supra Table 1, notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
135. (.95 x .25) + (.75 x .75) = .80 (or 80%).
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Table 2: Deferential Standard of Review with Varying
Levels of Appellate Court Accuracy
Trial court is correct
(90%)
Trial court is incorrect
(10%)
Box 1: Correct result Box 2: Correct result
Appelte Appellate court affirms a Appellate court reverses
25% of cases cort correct trial court an incorrect trial court
(Appellate (95%) decision decision
court has [21.375% of all cases]1 36  [2.375% of all cases]
high Box 3: Incorrect result Box 4: Incorrect result
confidence; it Ap lte Appellate court reverses Appellate court affirms
will reverse if a correct trial court an incorrect trial court
it disagrees) incorrect decision decision
[1.125% of all cases] [.125% of all cases]
Appellate Box 5: Correct result Box 6: Incorrect result
court Appellate court affirms a Appellate court affirms
75% of cases dbeen correct trial court an incorrect trial court
(Appellate have decision decision
court has correct [50.625% of all cases] [5.625% of all cases]
lower
Appellate
confidence; it Box 7: Correct result Box 8: Incorrect result
will affirm court Appellate court affirms a Appellate court affirms
even if it ha correct trial court an incorrect trial court
disagrees) ice decision decision
incorrect [16.875% of all cases] [1.875% of all cases]
Adding these numbers, the systemic likelihood of being correct in the Table 2
scenario is 91.25%: Box 1 (21.375%) + Box 2 (2.375%) + Box 5 (50.625%) + Box
7 (16.875%). This is an improvement over both the trial court's likelihood (90%) and
the appellate court's likelihood (80%) of reaching the correct result. The key gains
in accuracy come in Box 2, where the appellate court is able to rely on its higher
level of confidence to reverse an incorrect trial court decision, and in Box 7, where
the appellate court refrains from incorrectly reversing a correct trial court decision.137
136. As above, this model assumes that the trial and appellate court's accuracy rates in any
given case are not correlated. Accordingly, the percentage of cases in each box is the product
of all three relevant probabilities: the likelihood the appellate court will have that confidence
level (high or low); the appellate court's likelihood of correctness at that confidence level; and
the trial court's likelihood of correctness. For example, the percentage of cases in Box 1 is .25
x .95 x .90 = .21375 (or 21.375%).
137. As with the earlier scenario, see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text, these
hypothetical percentages are chosen merely to illustrate the consequences of this proposed
approach to appellate review in cases where the trial court's average accuracy rate is higher
than the appellate court's. Accuracy-enhancing results would also obtain with different
average accuracy rates or a different distribution of accuracy levels within those averages.
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Alternatively, one can model a situation where the trial court's case-specific
likelihood of correctness is lower than usual. One might think of these cases as those
where the trial court's decision has indicia of incorrectness, such as considering
improper factors or failing to consider important factors. Table 3 (below) assumes
that in 75% of cases, the trial court has a 95% likelihood of being correct. In the
remaining 25% of cases (those where the trial court's reasoning or other aspects of
the record raise a red flag), the trial court has only a 75% likelihood of being correct.
On average, the trial court has the same 90% likelihood of being correct as in the
earlier examples.138 Under the approach proposed here, the appellate court may
reverse the trial court only in those cases where it has the higher likelihood of being
correct.
Table 3: Deferential Standard of Review with Varying





Box 1: Correct result Box 2: Correct result
75% of cases Trial court Appellate court affirms a Appellate court affirms
(Higher trial is correct correct rial court a correct trial court
court (95%) decision decision
accuracy [57% of all cases]139  [1 4 .2 5% of all cases]
level; Box 3: Incorrect result Box 4: Incorrect result
appellate Trial court Appellate court affirms Appellate court affirms
court will is incorrect an incorrect trial court an incorrect trial court
affirm even if (50%.) decision decision
it disagrees) [3% of all cases] ['75% of all cases]
Box 5: Correct result Box 6: Incorrect result
25% of cases Trial court Appellate court affirms a Appellate court reverses
(Lower trial is correct correct rial court a correct trial court
court (75%) decision decision
accuracy [15% of all cases] [3 .75% of all cases]
level; Box 7: Correct result Box 8: Incorrect result
appellate Trial court Appellate court reverses Appellate court affirms
court will is incorrect an incorrect trial court an incorrect trial court
reverse if it (25%) decision decision
disagrees) [5% of all cases] [1. 2 5% of all cases]
In the top half of the Table 3, the appellate court perceives that the trial court has
a higher relative likelihood of correctness (95% for the trial court, as opposed to 80%
for the appellate court), so the appellate court will affirm even if it would have
reached a different result under a de novo standard. In the bottom half of the table,
however, the trial court has a lower case-specific likelihood of correctness (75% for
138. (.95 x .75) + (.75 x .25) = .90 (or 90%).
139. As with Table 2, the percentage of cases in each box in Table 3 is the product of the




the trial court, as opposed to 80% for the appellate court), so the appellate court will
reverse if it disagrees.
Adding up these numbers, the aggregate likelihood of being correct in the Table
3 model is 91.25%-again, higher than both the appellate court's and trial court's
accuracy rates.14 The key improvements come in Box 2, where the appellate court
refrains from incorrectly reversing a correct trial court decision, and in Box 7, where
the appellate court correctly reverses based on the trial court's lower case-specific
likelihood of correctness.
These models reveal that systemic accuracy is improved when the appellate
court's decision hinges on the relative likelihood of error at a case-specific level. An
appellate court's higher level of confidence can justify reversal even if-as a general
matter-the appellate court's likelihood of correctness is lower than the trial court's.
Likewise, indicia of incorrectness in the trial court-say, the trial court's
consideration of improper factors in its analysis-might demonstrate that the
appellate court has a higher relative likelihood of correctness in that particular case.
Within the context of the current approach to appellate review, this understanding
would provide a coherent way for a deferential standard of review to operate in
practice. A deferential standard of review should not be a fixed, heightened burden
of reversal. Rather, deferential review should ultimately examine the relative
likelihood of correctness, informed both by general, institutional features of the trial
and appellate courts and by more specific features of the particular case on appeal.141
To be clear, this inquiry would not require the appellate court to calculate with
mathematical precision the accuracy rates of it and the trial court. Rather, this
standard would conceptualize considerations that already inform appellate review:
general institutional considerations (such as the trial court's advantage in assessing
the credibility of live witness testimony);4 2 the appellate court's case-specific level
of confidence (how "definite and firm" its conviction is);143 and particular strengths
or weaknesses in the trial court's analysis or decision-making process.14 4
140. The relevant numbers in Table 3 are: Box 1 (57%) + Box 2 (14.25%) + Box 5 (150%)
+ Box 7 (5%).
141. At times, the Supreme Court has recognized that the practical effect of a deferential
standard might vary depending on how strong an advantage the trial court has given the precise
circumstances of a particular case. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
500 (1984) (noting that "[t]he same 'clearly erroneous' standard applies to findings based on
documentary evidence as to those based entirely on oral testimony, but the presumption has
lesser force in the former situation than in the latter") (citations omitted).
142. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. It would be similar, in this sense, to the
preponderance-of-evidence standard that provides the typical burden of proof in civil cases.
That standard is often framed in probabilistic terms: a plaintiff must "establish the probability
of her claim to greater than 0.5." Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof,
122 YALE L.J. 1254, 1256 (2013); see also John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding
Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1072 (1968) (describing "the preponderance-of-the vidence
test in civil cases" as "where the jury must merely be satisfied that the probability is greater
than 50 percent-in other words, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff has a right to
recover"); Harold L. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1080,
1115 (1966) (defining "'preponderance' of the evidence" to mean "probability greater than
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Although this Part has developed this comparative-likelihood-of-correctness
approach as a way for appellate courts to apply a deferential standard of appellate
review under the Supreme Court's current framework, it also sheds important light
on the threshold question of whether a deferential standard of review should apply
in the first place. Current doctrine requires courts to make an abstract, front-end
determination of whether trial courts are "better positioned" than appellate courts to
decide a particular issue as a general matter.145 Properly understood, however, the
appellate court's application of a deferential standard should ultimately hinge on the
more targeted, back-end question of whether the appellate court or the trial court is
more likely to be correct in this particular case regarding that particular issue. That
inquiry will necessarily take into account any general advantages the trial court may
have. One could imagine, therefore, a unified approach to appellate review that
would dispense with any ex ante choice between a de novo and deferential standard
and focus instead on whether the appellate court has a higher likelihood of
correctness than the trial court. 146
III. UNIFIED APPELLATE REVIEW
This Part develops the unified approach to appellate review suggested in Part II.
As illustrated above, appellate review maximizes systemic accuracy when the
appellate inquiry focuses on the relative likelihood of correctness between the trial
court and the appellate court in a particular case. Section A of this Part describes how
this basic standard would apply in practice, highlighting its advantages over the
Supreme Court's current framework. Section B responds to potential critiques of this
Article's proposal. And Section C critically examines the premise that the choice
between deferential and de novo review affects the amount of "energy" an appellate
court must expend when deciding a particular appeal.
fifty percent"). But a decisionmaker is not required to make a formal probability calculation.
See, e.g., Brownv. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) (noting that
the preponderance standard requires a "greater than 0.5 [chance] that the plaintiff is in the
right" but recognizing that "[1]itigation rarely produces enough information to permit the
announcement of a confident probability estimate").
145. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
146. This same logic could apply to issues for which the appellate court is "better
positioned" as a general matter. The Supreme Court's current approach suggests that de novo
review should apply to such issues. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. Yet that
would overlook the possibility that aspects of aparticular decision suggest higher-than-usual
trial court accuracy. And it would overlook the possibility of lower-than-usual appellate
accuracy; if the appellate court can have a "definite and firm conviction" to justify reversal
under a deferential standard, see supra note 124 and accompanying text, perhaps it can have
an indefinite and soft conviction that should warrant affirmance even though, in general, the
appellate court might be better positioned than the trial court. This Article's approach accounts
for this possibility as well, using a unified standard that looks at relative accuracy in a
particular case, accounting for both generalized and case-specific considerations.
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A. Implementing a Comparative Likelihood-of-Correctness Standard
As discussed above, the Supreme Court's current approach to standards of
appellate review gives appellate courts de novo authority to decide all questions of
law regarding a particular issue-even when a deferential standard of review applies
to that issue as a general matter. That would continue to be the case under this
Article's proposal.14 7 Where this Article's approach departs from the current
framework is with respect to non-legal questions. Instead of slotting such issues for
deferential or non-deferential review at the front end, this Article develops a unified
inquiry into the comparative likelihood of correctness between the appellate court
and the trial court decision being reviewed.
Accordingly, in cases where the appellate court is unable to identify an error of
law by the trial court, it may reverse the trial court only when its likelihood of being
correct on that issue is higher than the trial court's likelihood of being correct. As
explained in Part II, deference to the court with the higher relative likelihood of
correctness maximizes ystemic accuracy.148 The overarching inquiry into which
court has a higher likelihood of being correct would consider both macro questions
(for example, the trial court's general advantage in assessing the credibility of live
witness testimony) and micro questions (for example, the appellate court's case-
specific level of confidence, or particular strengths or weaknesses in the trial court's
analysis).14 9 This Article's approach would not require appellate courts to make a
formal, quantitative finding regarding relative accuracy rates." It would simply
provide a framework for assessing both generalized institutional considerations,
which currently inform the selection of the standard of appellate review for a
particular issue, and case-specific features of any given appeal."
147. Part IV proposes a workable approach to identifying what kinds of trial court errors
involve questions of law that would trigger de novo appellate review. See infra notes 200-17
and accompanying text.
148. See supra Part II. Although this Article's focus is federal appellate review of federal
trial court decisions, the inquiry into relative likelihood of correctness might also address
concerns that arise in judicial review of agencies or, perhaps, state courts under circumstances
where there is a "danger of systemic bias." Monaghan, supra note 20, at 239. Professor
Monaghan noted that "the need to guard against systemic bias" seemed to be a justification
for de novo review of some constitutional issues, id. at 272-73, although he questioned
whether federal courts should presume such bias on the part of state courts, see id. at 272 ("The
premise that state courts are to be suspected of distorted factfinding and law application is
disquieting."). Whatever the precise institutional context, the approach proposed here could
take such bias into account in assessing the relative likelihood of correctness.
149. To be clear, the appellate court would decide independently the factors that increase
or decrease the likelihood of correctness with respect to any given issue.
150. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
151. Accordingly, the unified approach proposed in this Article would be consistent with
Federal Civil Rule 52's instruction that "[findings of fact, whether based on oral or other
evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). The
comparative-likelihood-of-correctness inquiry would provide a coherent way to understand
how the "clear error" standard would apply in practice. Rule 52 reflects the notion that trial
courts have a general institutional advantage when it comes to factual findings; but the
presence of either higher-than-usual indicia of trial court error or higher-than-usual evels of
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Although the initial driver for this Article's proposed approach is to optimize
systemic accuracy, it will also enhance the law-clarification function of appellate
courts. The appellate court may always address questions of law de novo.15 2 Even
beyond such legal issues, however, appellate courts will be called upon to identify
conditions that increase or decrease the likelihood that a court's decision on a
particular issue is correct. These would include the generalized institutional
characteristics that currently inform the selection of the standard of review for
particular issues. The trial court's ability to evaluate live witness testimony, for
example, is a factor that increases the trial court's relative likelihood of correctness
with respect to issues that hinge on the credibility of such testimony.5 3 But appellate
courts deploying this unified standard would also identify case-specific features of a
particular decision that either increase or decrease the likelihood of correctness-and
thereby provide guidance to future decisionmakers.
In essence, the price of admission an appellate court must pay to reverse the trial
court is that it must articulate why it believes it is more likely to be correct than the
trial court. "4 Even in this situation, however, the appellate court would have a choice.
It could make its own, relatively more accurate decision. Or it could remand to the
trial court. If, for example, the appellate court has identified weaknesses in the trial
court's process or analysis, it could remand for the trial court to address those
weaknesses by making a renewed assessment of the issue.
The unified standard developed here also provides a sound conceptual foundation
for the prevailing "exception" for legal errors. When the trial court has made an error
of law, that raises the likelihood that the trial court did not reach the correct result.
Accordingly, a legal error by the trial court can justify some kind of appellate
remedy. This could be an ultimate ruling by the appellate court, on the theory that its
decision-which is unhampered by the trial court's legal error-is more likely to be
correct. Or it could be a remand for the trial court to revisit the issue with the appellate
court's legal guidance."5
appellate court confidence would justify an appellate remedy under both this Article's
proposal, see supra notes 141-46, 148-50 and accompanying text, and under the Supreme
Court's current guidance regarding the "clear error" standard, see supra notes 122-25 and
accompanying text. That this Article's unified approach applies to all rulings has the added
benefit of making it unnecessary for courts to delineate between "[f]indings of fact" (for which
deferential review is required by Rule 52) and other non-legal findings (for which the proper
standard of review is currently determined using the Court's problematic framework described
in Part I).
152. See supra notes 50-51, 147 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 111 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text (describing other general advantages trial courts might have regarding
particular issues).
154. Although this inquiry does not require appellate courts to declare its and the trial
court's likelihoods of correctness in precise mathematical terms, it would require the appellate
court to justify its assessment that it is more likely to be correct on a particular issue in a
particular case, with reference to considerations that have always informed appellate review.
See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
155. In examining the legal-error exception, one might conceivably inquire into whether
appellate courts are in fact "better positioned" than trial courts to decide questions of law.
There are certainly strong arguments that, as a matter of institutional design, appellate courts
2020] 27
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
An additional benefit of this Article's approach is that it would encourage higher-
quality trial court rulings. Trial courts would be aware that summary decisions,
decisions that are not subjected to adversarial testing, or ones that are based on
improper factors would come to the appellate court with a lower likelihood of
correctness, increasing the appellate court's ability to reverse.156 Conversely, trial
court decisions that reflect full consideration of the relevant factors and evidence
would come to the appellate court with a higher likelihood of correctness, reducing
the appellate court's ability to reverse.15 ' This provides a tangible benefit for careful,
thorough trial court decisions-unlike de novo review, for which the trial judge
knows that the appellate court has carte blanche to second-guess her regardless.158
are more likely to decide legal questions correctly. See, e.g., Oldfather, supra note 20, at 327-
32 (discussing three "competence-based justifications" for de novo review of legal issues).
But de novo appellate review of legal issues might also be justified by the structural ability of
appellate courts to promote uniformity regarding legal questions-a federal appellate court
can issue decisions that are binding precedent on all courts within its circuit, but a trial court
cannot. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 850-52 (1994) (describing how the obligation of inferior
courts to follow higher-court precedents promotes uniformity and predictability); Adam N.
Steinman, Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1947, 1962-63 (2017) (describing the obligation of
vertical stare decisis). Perhaps for this reason, the Supreme Court's current framework does
not require an issue-by-issue assessment of whether the appellate court is "better positioned"
to decide a particular question of law-the legal-error exception applies regardless. See supra
notes 50-51 and accompanying text. Likewise, this Article's proposal does not require a
comparative-likelihood-of-correctness inquiry regarding questions of law. See supra note 142
and accompanying text. That said, the specialized treatment of legal issues warrants closer
examination of how to distinguish questions of "law" from other issues; this Article proposes
a possible solution to this puzzle in Part IV.
156. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text; see also supra note 130 (providing
examples of reversals based on shortcomings in the trial court's reasoning); Comm'r v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292 (1960) (reversing and remanding based in part because "the
District Court as trier of fact made only the simple and unelaborated finding that the transfer
in question was a 'gift"' and noting that "there comes a point where findings become so sparse
and conclusory as to give to revelation of what the District Court's concept of the determining
facts and legal standard may be").
157. See Yoshino, supra note 20, at 281 (arguing with respect to legislative facts that
"[t]rial courts should receive more deference if they use their institutional competence to
conduct trials or other evidentiary hearings" and that "[i]n contrast, they should receive no
deference if they simply take judicial notice of a legislative fact").
158. Similar arguments have been made regarding the appropriate role of federal habeas
review of state court decisions. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REV. 441, 451 (1963) ("I could imagine
nothing more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective
conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult and subtle art of judging well,
than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be called by
someone else."); Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners: How Should AEDPA's Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor?,
2001 Wis. L. REV. 1493, 1519 (noting that the logical consequence of pure de novo review is
that "it would not matter whether the [lower] court undertook its task carelessly, indifferently,
thoroughly, or deliberately").
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Accordingly, this Article's approach would play a valuable information-forcing
role. 159 It would encourage trial courts to issue decisions that reveal their reasoning
and analysis because the appellate court might view a poorly justified decision as
less likely to be correct. And it would encourage appellate courts to identify-both
as a general institutional matter and on a case-specific level-factors that increase or
decrease the likelihood that a court's decision on a particular issue is correct.
More generally, this Article's approach avoids the mismatch between the practical
operation of appellate review and some of the Supreme Court's justifications for
selecting a deferential or de novo standard of review for particular issues. As
discussed in Part I, the current approach can endow appellate courts with the power
of de novo review-ostensibly because an issue involves "legal . .. work" or would
require "elaborating on a broad legal standard"160-regardless of whether the
appellate court actually engages in such legal work or law clarification when
deciding a particular appeal. 161 Under this Article's unified framework, the appellate
court would have to earn its ability to second-guess the trial court by doing that "legal
work," either by identifying particular errors of law by the trial court or explaining
what factors increase or decrease the likelihood of a correct result. This single
template for appellate review serves the systemic goals of error correction and law
clarification without the problematic step of assigning distinct standards of review to
particular issues at the front end.
B. Responses to Possible Critiques
Arguments against this Article's proposal might come from opposite directions.
This Section responds to potential criticisms that (1) it gives appellate courts too
much power to overturn trial court decisions, and (2) it gives appellate courts too
little power to overturn trial court decisions.
As for the first of these, one might argue that this Article's proposal would put
too few constraints on appellate courts when reviewing trial court decisions, because
it would be up to the appellate court itself to decide whether it is more likely to be
correct than the trial court.16 2 Although this is indeed how this Article's approach
would operate, this concern is largely unavoidable given the hierarchical structure of
the federal judiciary. Under the current system, even when a deferential standard of
159. For examples of scholars exploring the capacity of legal doctrines and institutions to
play an information-forcing role in other areas of law, see, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt & D.
Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1264-65 (2017); Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm "With Teeth":
Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1589,
1591 (2014) (arguing that "executive oversight and judicial review play central information-
forcing roles vis-a-vis agencies"); J.H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing
Rules, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 899, 904-09 (2015).
160. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018).
161. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of this
Article's proposal); see also supra Part II (arguing that a comparative-likelihood-of-
correctness inquiry improves systemic accuracy).
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review applies, appellate courts decide for themselves what constitutes an "abuse of
discretion";16 3 they decide for themselves whether they have a sufficiently "definite
and firm conviction" to justify reversal under a clear-error standard;164 and they
decide for themselves whether any "legal error" was committed that justifies reversal
regardless of whether deferential or de novo review applies. 165 A court that is higher
in the judicial hierarchy must ultimately police any limits that are placed upon its
authority, and it may act self-interestedly (or simply make mistakes) in doing so. 166
This Article's approach, however, provides a more significant structural check on
self-aggrandizing behavior by appellate courts: reversal of a trial court's decision
would always require the appellate court o provide affirmative justification. That
justification could be a legal error by the trial court.167 Or it could be an explanation
of why the appellate court believes that it is more likely to be correct than the trial
court. 168 By contrast, the current approach to deferential review requires little more
than what Professor Maurice Rosenberg called "appellate grunting"-the appellate
court may reverse even if it "does nothing by way of offering reasons or guidance
for the future."169
An alternative line of critique might be that this Article's approach would
constrain appellate courts too much. Indeed, this proposal would eliminate what
might be called "pure" de novo review. There would be no situation where the
appellate court can reverse the trial court based solely on the appellate court's belief
that the outcome should have been different. On closer analysis, however, potential
justifications for unfettered de novo review are unavailing.
First, consider the argument that pure de novo review is needed on error-
correction grounds because it gives appellate courts the greatest capacity to correct
trial court mistakes.?17 As described above, de novo review reduces accuracy in those
cases where the appellate court has a lower likelihood of correctness than the trial
court.171 To insist on unfettered de novo review, therefore, would increase the
likelihood of systemic error as compared to this Article's form of unified appellate
review.
163. See Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 659 (noting how "the phrase 'abuse of discretion' .. .
convey[s] the appellate court's disagreement with what the trial court has done, but does
nothing by way of offering reasons or guidance for the future").
164. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (describing uncertainty regarding
what constitutes "clear error").
165. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
166. As Justice Jackson observed about the Supreme Court (the highest appellate court in
the federal system), "[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final." Brownv. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
167. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
169. Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 659 ("The phrase 'abuse of discretion' does not
communicate meaning. It is a form of ill-tempered appellate grunting and should be dispensed
with.").
170. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 501-02 (requiring de novo
review of a trial court's finding on whether a defendant made a false statement with "actual
malice" in part because "the constitutional values protected by the rule make it imperative that
judges-and in some cases judges of this Court-make sure that it is correctly applied").
171. See supra Table 1, notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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A second rationale for pure de novo review might be to provide clearer guidance
to lower courts on a particular issue.172 This Article's proposal, however, gives
appellate courts ample opportunity to provide such guidance. As with the current
approach to all standards of appellate review, appellate courts may always provide
clarification on legal questions independently, without deference to the trial court on
such legal issues. Even where the appellate court is unable to identify substantive
legal errors by the trial court, this Article's approach allows appellate courts to freely
identify factors that either strengthen or undermine the accuracy of a judicial decision
regarding that issue.173 It would simply insist that, after making these inquiries, the
appellate court should not reverse a trial court's decision unless it determines that it
is more likely to be correct than the trial court. Although that standard entails some
deference to the trial court, the Supreme Court itself has recognized that deferential
review by appellate courts can still "narrow[]" the "channel of discretion,"1 7 4 and
"give[] substance to the notion that there are limits to that discretion."175
One might posit that the appellate court would provide even more guidance by
reaching its own ultimate conclusion without deference to the trial court. Such
guidance, however, would come at the cost of increasing the likelihood of error-as
explained above. The key difference between this Article's approach and pure de
novo review is that the latter would allow the appellate court to dictate a final result
even where the appellate court is less likely to be correct. Essentially, the only
additional guidance an unfettered de novo approach might provide would be
guidance that is more likely to lead future courts toward incorrect results.
Finally, one might urge pure de novo review as a way to foster consistency or
equal treatment among litigants. When selecting de novo review for certain Fourth
Amendment rulings, for example, the Supreme Court majority expressed concern
that a "policy of sweeping deference would permit, in the absence of any significant
difference in the facts, the Fourth Amendment's incidence to turn on whether
different trial judges draw general conclusions that the facts are sufficient or
insufficient to constitute probable cause," and that "[s]uch varied results would be
inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law."1 76
As an initial matter, this critique glosses over the process of determining whether
there is, in fact, an "absence of any significant difference in the facts" of two cases.17 7
If an appellate court hinks that a common set of facts must yield the same result in
172. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (describing the view that case-by-case
de novo review by appellate courts can clarify the law in situations where legal requirements
cannot be articulated with precision).
173. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of this
Article's proposal).
174. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (quoting Friendly,
supra note 20, at 772).
175. Id. at 1934.
176. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bringar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171 (1949)).
177. Id.
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both cases, it may clarify the law such that those facts compel that result.178 This
would be possible under both deferential review and this Article's uniform
comparative-likelihood-of-correctness tandard. Under this Article's proposal more
specifically, an appellate court could identify a trial court's failure to appreciate the
significance of a particular factual scenario as increasing the likelihood of an
incorrect trial court decision. 179
In any event, invoking a desire to avoid "varied results" begs the question.
Deferential review by its nature tolerates variation-even, potentially, in cases that
present similar factual or evidentiary records.180 If such variation were intolerable,
deferential review would never be permissible. To justify pure de novo review on the
basis that it fosters consistency, therefore, requires an explanation of why
consistency is valuable for its own sake-and why such consistency ought to be the
dominant concern for some issues but not others.
Admittedly, scholars as far back as Aristotle have embraced the maxim that like
cases should be treated alike. 181 Treating like cases alike, however, is not the same
thing as treating like cases correctly. In other words, complying with Aristotle's
maxim could well mean that two like cases are both wrongly decided.8 2 That is
precisely the risk that pure de novo review would create as compared to this Article's
unified approach. Unfettered de novo review will increase the likelihood of an
incorrect outcome-unless, as this Article's proposal would allow, the appellate
court can provide reasons why it is more likely to be correct than the trial court.
Moreover, as scholars have acknowledged, to obtain genuinely equal treatment
requires "substantive criteria indicating which people are equal for particular
purposes and what constitutes equal treatment.""' This Article's approach would
give appellate courts plenary authority to articulate those substantive criteria, either
by providing legal guidance relevant to its review of the trial court's decision,
178. See infra notes 200-13 and accompanying text (describing how generalizable legal
principles can instruct that the presence of a particular antecedent condition requires a
particular conclusion).
179. See supra note 130 (describing examples where problems with the trial court's
reasoning and analysis justified correction by the appellate court); see also supra notes 141-
51 and accompanying text (describing this Article's proposed comparative-likelihood-of-
correctness approach).
180. See Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574 U.S. 418, 424 (2015) (rejecting the argument
that an issue should not be subject to a jury trial because it could mean that "another jury,
hearing the same case, might reach a different conclusion" and recognizing that decision-
making in some disputes "necessarily requires judgment calls" even when suchjudgment calls
"involve some degree of uncertainty").
181. See John E. Coons, Consistency, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 59 & n.1 (1987) (citing
ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA).
182. Cf Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1989) ("[I]f
most members of a particular group of people have been subjected to grossly unjust
treatment-say, slavery or genocide-seeing that the rest of the members are subjected to the
same treatment is no less wrong despite its furtherance of 'equality."').
183. Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea ofEquality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169
(1983); see also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea ofEquality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982)
(arguing that the idea of equality is simply that "people who by a rule should be treated alike
should by the rule be treated alike" and that this notion is "entirely 'circular"').
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identifying factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of reaching a correct
result, or both.184 Pure de novo review, by contrast, would insist on such authority
even when the appellate court is unable to articulate such criteria and where the
appellate court's deviation from the trial court's decision would reduce the likelihood
of a correct outcome.
C. Standards of Review and Appellate Court Energy
Before moving on, it is worth mentioning one other point that has occasionally
appeared in the judicial discussions of standards of appellate review: the idea that de
novo appellate review is somehow more difficult-or requires more "energy"-than
deferential appellate review.185 The Supreme Court alluded to this, for example, in a
decision considering the standard of appellate review for an award of attorney's fees
to a plaintiff under the Equal Access to Justice Act based on the trial court's finding
that the federal government's litigation position was not "substantially justified."186
In selecting a deferential standard of review for this issue, the Court expressed
concern that de novo review might require the appellate court to obtain "the district
judge's full knowledge of the factual setting" and that this "acquisition will often
come at unusual expense, requiring the court to undertake the unaccustomed task of
reviewing the entire record."187 The Court also worried about the "investment of
appellate energy" that would be required to engage in de novo review.188
The Supreme Court conveyed a similar notion in its recent decision on the
standard of appellate review for a district court's determination of a child's "habitual
residence" under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction.189 After holding that this issue is subject to review for clear error, the
Court observed: "As a deferential standard of review, clear-error review speeds up
appeals and thus serves the Convention's premium on expedition."190 This is the
other side of the appellate energy coin-insofar as deferential review requires less
effort, the appellate court can decide appeals more quickly under a deferential
standard.
In some ways, embracing this concern about the energy required for de novo
review would support this Article's proposal, which argues for dispensing entirely
184. See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 6-190 and accompanying text.
186. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 554-55 (1988).
187. Id. at 560.
188. Id. at 561; see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 403 (1990) (citing
Pierce's concern that "a de novo standard would require the courts of appeals to invest time
and energy in the unproductive task"); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 362-63 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Pierce's observation that the "unusual expense" required to
acquire "the district judge's full knowledge of the factual setting" counseled in favor of
deferential review (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560)); see also United States v. McConney,
728 F.2d 1195, 1201 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("It can hardly be disputed that application
of a non-deferential standard of review requires a greater investment of appellate resources
than does application of the clearly erroneous standard.").
189. Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 727 (2020).
190. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
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with pure de novo review. If pure de novo review is more resource intensive, this
Article's approach should conserve appellate court energy. That said, decisions that
invoke this assumption do not explain exactly why deferential review is easier or
quicker than de novo review. Although an empirical study of this question is well
beyond the scope of this Article, the premise is far from self-evident.
It is fair to say that, all other things being equal, deferential review would be more
likely to lead to affirmance of the lower court than non-deferential review. But it
does not follow that deferential review requires less expense, energy, or effort by the
appellate court. Indeed, non-deferential review might be less costly in one respect.
For de novo review, the appellate court needs only to make an independent
assessment of the issues and arguments presented. The trial court's handling of the
issue is irrelevant. Deferential review, however, may require special attention to
particular aspects of the trial court's reasoning, separate from and in addition to the
substantive merits of the issues at stake.191
One possible connection between the standard of appellate review and the effort
required by the appellate court may be that more energy is required when a particular
case is closer to the threshold for reversal under the governing standard. In other
words, it may take more effort to decide a "close case" than one where the correct
disposition is more readily apparent. But even that notion does not suggest that
deferential review requires less energy than non-deferential review. In a case where
the appellate court can easily determine that the trial court was wrong, it can easily
reverse under a de novo standard. It might require more careful scrutiny-and more
effort-to determine whether that incorrect ruling falls on the reversible side of a
clear-error or an abuse-of-discretion threshold.192 Accordingly, the premise that de
novo review necessarily requires more energy or expense than deferential review
does not stand up to scrutiny.
Even if one accepted the view that de novo review requires more energy or effort
than deferential review, that notion would seem to be far too blunt an instrument to
drive the selection of the standard of appellate review. Consider, for example,
summary judgment. A grant of summary judgment is uniformly understood to be
191. In this sense, deferential review also imposes additional costs on the litigants,
requiring them to develop an entirely new round of arguments focused on whether the trial
court's decision passes muster through the lens of a standard of appellate review that no party
would have had to address in the trial court proceedings.
192. To illustrate the point quantitatively (with the usual caveats, see supra note 114),
imagine that an appellate court will reverse under a de novo standard if trial court error is more
than 50% likely, and an appellate court will reverse under a deferential standard if trial court
error is more than 90% likely. In a case where the likelihood of error appears to be very close
to the 90% likelihood-of-error line, the appellate court could easily reverse under a de novo
standard; yet the appellate court would have to invest more energy to determine on which side
of the 90% line the case falls for purposes of deferential review. One scholar has made a similar
point in examining the standard for video review of on-field calls by football referees. Arguing
against a deferential "indisputable video evidence" standard, he observed that a "de novo
standard would speed things up" in cases where a referee "promptly determines that the initial
call was wrong" after video review; but with a deferential standard, additional delay and effort
would be required "to mine for the shot that would seal the deal" by showing "that the
incorrectness of the on-field call is indisputable." Berman, supra note 110, at 1705-06.
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subject to de novo appellate review.193 Summary judgment rulings come in all shapes
and sizes, however. They can have dramatically different stakes, involve vastly
different records in terms of complexity and volume, and entail a wide range of
different claims and issues.194
Finally, it is incoherent-or at least incomplete-to use the selection of an issue-
specific standard of appellate review to optimize resource allocation across an entire
appellate docket. It is impossible to assess whether this issue warrants a more costly
form of appellate review without comparing it to the full universe of other issues on
that docket. And even if one could adequately undertake such an inquiry, it is far
from clear that answering that question on an issue-by-issue basis is the most sensible
way to allocate appellate energy most appropriately.
Not surprisingly, other efforts by appellate courts o allocate resources across their
caseload have proven to be quite controversial. Courts have, for example, developed
screening and tracking practices that deny oral argument or even full briefing for a
large percentage of appeals, often leading to unpublished or summary dispositions.195
Unlike the selection between de novo and deferential review,196 these mechanisms
tangibly affect the amount of "appellate energy"197 that is required to decide
193. See, e.g., L.F. v. Lake Wash. Sch. Dist. #414, 947 F.3d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 2020);
Richards v. PAR, Inc., 954 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2020); Stoe v. Barr, 960 F.3d 627, 629
(D.C. Cir. 2020); 1077 Madison St., LLC v. Daniels, 954 F.3d 460, 463 (2d Cir. 2020).
Although the Supreme Court has yet to apply its standard-of-review selection framework to
this question, it has acknowledged that "on summary judgment we may examine the record de
novo without relying on the lower courts' understanding." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech.
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465 n.10 (1992).
194. The same could be said about punitive damages awards, for which the Supreme Court
has applied its standard-of-review selection framework. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279-80 (1989); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431-40 (2001). Punitive damages awards can vary significantly
in terms of not only the award's raw dollar amount but also the complexity of the record and
issues relevant to assessing the merits of the award.
195. See, e.g., McAlister, supra note 88, at 536 ("Traditional appellate process-including
oral argument and judicial scrutiny-continues for the system's haves. But for its have-nots,
the promise of an appeal as of right has become little more than a rubber stamp: 'You lose."');
id. at 535-36 (noting that "[j]udicial staff attorneys ... review and resolve appeals destined
for nonpublication without significant judicial oversight" and that such unpublished decisions
are "short, perfunctory," and "not safe for human consumption"); David C. Vladeck & Mitu
Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1667, 1680 (2005) (noting case-management processes that have "abandoned the
cornerstones of appellate decision-making," such as "full consideration of all issues raised on
appeal, adequate oral argument and briefing opportunities, well-reasoned published
dispositions, and direct involvement of Article III judges in every stage of the process").
Another plausible-if more drastic-way to allocate appellate resources would be to eliminate
the right to appeal entirely in certain categories of cases. See Dalton, supra note 71, at 95-107
(considering whether certain categories of cases should be subject to discretionary appeals
rather than appeals as of right).
196. See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
197. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561 (1988).
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particular appeals. And they have been justifiably criticized for creating a "two-tiered
approach to justice, with some cases receiving far less attention than others."198
For all these reasons, it is problematic to use the expenditure of appellate energy
as a driver for selecting the standard of appellate review for particular issues. That
the standard of review raises or lowers the resources required to decide a case is a
questionable premise. And even if it did, an issue-by-issue inquiry is both too broad
and too narrow-too broad because it presumes that all cases presenting the same
issue justify the same level of resources, and too narrow because a coherent
assessment of the appropriate level must necessarily compare that issue to all other
issues across that court's docket.
IV. CORRALLING THE LEGAL ERROR EXCEPTION
Under both this Article's proposal and the Supreme Court's existing approach to
standards of review, appellate courts always have authority to correct legal errors de
novo. This exception transcends the Court's issue-specific selection framework that
this Article has critiqued-it permits de novo review of legal issues even ifdeferential
review is selected for a particular issue. The scope of this legal-error exception has
received fairly little attention from the Supreme Court, which is somewhat surprising
because it has the potential to subvert a deferential standard of review even when the
Court's current selection framework requires such deference.
The rule that legal questions may be resolved de novo would likewise be a concern
under this Article's approach, which leaves that legal-error exception in place.
Insofar as ambiguity surrounding the legal-error exception continues under the
Court's current approach, that ambiguity is not a reason to reject this Article's
proposal. It is worth considering, however, whether the legal-error exception might
be refined in a way that can avoid its overuse by opportunistic appellate courts.199
198. Steinman, supra note 155, at 2007; see also supra note 195.
199. What constitutes a legal issue-especially as distinguished from afactual issue-is
an inquiry that arises in various areas of law, and commentators have often wrestled with
whether the concept is capable of a coherent definition. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael
S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (2003) ("The
importance of the law-fact distinction is surpassed only by its mysteriousness."); Walter
Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417
(1921) ("[T]here is no logical distinction between statements which are grouped by the courts
under the phrases 'statements of fact' and 'conclusions of law."'); Nathan Isaacs, The Law and
the Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1922) (noting "the illusion that there is a clear and easily
discernible difference between propositions of law and propositions of fact" and "the utter
futility of the rough classification of questions as questions of law and of fact"); Monaghan,
supra note 20, at 232 ("This distinction has long caused perplexity in such diverse areas as
contracts, torts, and administrative law." (footnotes omitted)); Clarence Morris, Law andFact,
55 HARv. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1942) (criticizing "[t]he naive assumption that law and fact
stand naturally apart"); see also Millerv. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) ("[T]he appropriate
methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the
least, elusive."); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (noting "the vexing
nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law"); Artvale, Inc. v.
Rugby Fabrics Corp., 363 F.2d 1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.) ("The common
approach seeking to dichotomize all decisions as either 'law' or 'fact' is too simplistic .... ").
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One solution would be to define the legal-error exception to apply only to
generalizable legal principles. More specifically, the power of de novo review under
the legal-error exception would exist only with respect to propositions that can be
expressed in the form "If A then B." 2 00 For example, if a defendant's false statement
about a public figure was not made with actual malice, then the First Amendment
forbids a civil defamation action based on that statement;201 if a state uses race as the
predominant factor in drawing a legislative district, then that district violates the
Fourteenth Amendment unless the design withstands trict scrutiny;202 if a defendant
was under the age of eighteen when he committed a crime, then it violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to impose the death penalty for that crime;203 if an
allegation in a complaint is conclusory, then the court does not need to accept it as
true in deciding whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be
granted;2 04 if an individual in custody is not "warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires,"
then it violates the Fifth Amendment for evidence obtained as a result of interrogation
to be used against him.205
This approach to the legal-error exception would give effect to the understanding
that, even under a deferential standard of review, the appellate court may
independently determine the governing legal standards de novo. Justice Kagan put
it well in the recent U.S. Bank decision, where the Court unanimously endorsed a
deferential standard of review for whether someone qualifies as a non-statutory
insider under bankruptcy law.206 Despite this, Justice Kagan observed that, although
the trial court "must settle on a legal test to determine whether someone is a non-
statutory insider[,] ... that choice of standard really resides with the next court: As
200. Such if-then rules are also called conditional statements. See IRVING M. COPI, CARL
COHEN & KENNETH MCMAHON, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 300 (14th ed. 2011) ("Where two
statements are combined by placing the word 'if' before the first and inserting the word 'then'
between them, the resulting compound statement is a conditional statement .... " (emphasis
omitted)). Speaking somewhat more precisely, a logician would describe such a rule as: "For
all cases, if A, then B." The case-specific antecedent finding (that A is true in particular case
n) would be An, and the case-specific conclusion (B is therefore true in particular case n) would
be Bn. See Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of
Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REv. 1737, 1769 n.191 (2013). Such if-then statements are
at the core of a syllogistic form of reasoning known as a modus ponens. See Steinman, Case
Law, supra note 155, at 1971. The decisional principle (If A, then B) is the major premise of
the syllogism, the antecedent finding (A) is the minor premise, and the conclusion (B) is the
conclusion. See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 23 (2016).
201. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
202. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463-64 (2017).
203. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("The Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of
18 when their crimes were committed.").
204. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
205. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
206. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 963 (2018).
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all parties agree, an appellate panel reviews such a legal conclusion without the
slightest deference."207
In U.S. Bank, the appellate court chose the following decisional principle: If the
closeness of a creditor's relationship with the debtor is comparable to that of the
enumerated insider classifications in the Bankruptcy Code and the relevant
transaction is negotiated at less than arm's length, then the creditor qualifies as a non-
statutory insider.20 As this example illustrates, the antecedent of an if-then rule
might have multiple parts. Here, the rule required both that (1) the closeness of the
relationship was comparable to statutory insiders, and (2) the particular transaction
was not negotiated at arm's length. Such multi-element tests are quite common,209
and they would qualify for de novo review under the legal-error exception that exists
under both the Supreme Court's current approach and this Article's proposal.
This understanding would also permit an appellate court o develop decisional
principles with respect to issues that are more traditionally factual. Consider the
Supreme Court's recent Cooper v. Harris decision, which hinged on whether North
Carolina used race as the predominant factor in drawing two legislative districts.210
Both the majority and the dissent agreed that this was a factual question subject to
clear-error review.21 1 The dissent, however, argued that the Court should adopt a
legal principle to deal with cases where the racial identification of voters (an
impermissible motivation) correlates highly with the party affiliation of voters (a
permissible motivation): if racial identification correlates highly with party
affiliation, then the plaintiff must submit an alternative redistricting map that could
have achieved permissible political objectives without the racial effects giving rise
to the racial gerrymandering allegation.212 This sort of decisional principle could also
be declared de novo under the unified framework proposed in this Article-it is a
generalizable rule that can be articulated in the form "If A then B." Indeed, although
the majority in Cooper rejected the dissent's proposed rule, it recognized this line of
argument as "legal rather than factual."213
An appellate court might also string multiple if-then principles together by
declaring what might be called subsidiary decisional principles. Consider, for
207. Id. at 965 (emphasis added); see also Monaghan, supra note 20, at 235 ("The
important point about law is that it yields a proposition that is general in character." (emphasis
in original)); id. ("Law declaration involves 'formulating a proposition [that] affects not only
the [immediate] case . . . but all others that fall within its terms. "' (alterations in original)
(quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 374-75 (tent. ed. 1958))).
208. U.S. Bank, 138 S. Ct. at 965 (citing In re Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993,
1001 (9th Cir. 2016)). The Supreme Court itself did not endorse that rule since it had granted
certiorari solely to decide the proper standard of review. See id. at 965-66.
209. See, e.g., GARNER ET AL., supra note 200, at 97 (describing the reasoning of a
hypothetical case as "if A, B, C, then X").
210. 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
211. Id. at 1464-65; id. at 1489-91 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. See id. at 1489 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001)).
213. Id. at 1478 (majority opinion) (describing North Carolina's argument that an
alternative map was required as a "legal rather than factual attack on the District Court's
finding of racial predominance").
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example, a constitutional challenge to a punitive damages award. The general
standard for such challenges is: if a punitive damages award is grossly excessive in
relation to a State's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence, then it violates
the Due Process Clause (If A then B). 2 " An appellate court might supplement this
standard by declaring that a particular ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages either is or is not grossly excessive (although the Supreme Court has not
yet done so, at least not for due process purposes).25 For example, if the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages exceeds 10:1, then the punitive damages award
is grossly excessive in relation to a State's legitimate interests in punishment and
deterrence (If X, thenA). As long as such a proposition can be stated in generalizable,
if-then form, it is the kind of decisional principle that an appellate court could declare
de novo.
As these examples illustrate, if-then rules might have varying degrees of
specificity. Whether a punitive damages award is "grossly excessive in relation to a
State's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence"216 is a far less determinate
inquiry than whether a punitive damages award exceeds the compensatory damages
award by more than 10:1. Although a distinction is often drawn between "rules"
(which are more mechanically applicable) and "standards" (which are more open-
ended),21 1 that distinction does not matter for purposes of this Article's proposal. The
crucial question is simply whether a principle can be stated in the form "IfA then B,"
regardless of whether the antecedent finding A is rule-like or standard-like.
This approach would provide a meaningful way to delineate the scope of the legal-
error exception because such decisional principles are identifiably distinct from other
aspects of a judicial decision. The antecedent finding A that plugs into the beginning
of a decisional principle (If A then B) cannot itself be expressed as an if-then
statement. A could be, for example: the defendant in this case acted with actual
malice; the state used race as the predominant factor in drawing this legislative
district; this transaction between this creditor and this debtor was not negotiated at
arm's length; or this award of punitive damages is grossly excessive. This Article's
approach would subject all such findings to the same unified standard of review
developed above: the appellate court can reverse the trial court's antecedent
finding-its choice of A or Not-A-only where the appellate court's likelihood of
correctness is higher than the trial court's likelihood of correctness.21
214. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
215. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("We
decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.").
That said, the Court's due process analysis gives such ratios significant weight, id. ("[I]n
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."), and it has explicitly embraced the
use of ratios for determining whether a punitive damages award is permissible under maritime
law, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 506-07 (2008).
216. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106
HARv. L. REV. 22 (1992).




This final Part addresses special categories of rulings-which typically arise in
constitutional litigation-for which the Supreme Court has suggested distinctive
appellate treatment. As a general matter, this Article's proposal would subject all
such rulings to the same unified template. But this Part acknowledges the possibility
that some issues may present a problem of asymmetric error costs-where an
erroneous decision in one direction is more costly than an erroneous decision in the
other direction. The Supreme Court's current approach to selecting standards of
appellate review does not consider the potential ramifications of asymmetric error
costs. Under this Article's proposal, however, there are a number of ways to take
such asymmetries into account. Although such modifications would constitute
narrow exceptions to this Article's unified approach, they could be sensibly
implemented to address circumstances where asymmetric error costs are a legitimate
concern.
A. Constitutional Issues and Legislative Facts
The Supreme Court has indicated that some issues arising in constitutional
litigation warrant de novo review regardless of the functional considerations that
dominate its general approach to standards of appellate review. There has been
considerable uncertainty and incoherence, however, regarding the precise scope and
justification for such specialized treatment.
Recall that under the Court's general, functional approach to selecting the
standard of review, appellate courts should apply a deferential standard of review to
an issue that will "immerse courts in case-specific factual issues-compelling them
to marshal and weigh evidence, make credibility judgments, and otherwise address.
.. 'multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization."'
219
In its recent U.S. Bank decision,2 20 the Court observed that this notion did not apply
to mixed questions of law and fact that are relevant to constitutional issues: "In the
constitutional realm,. .. the calculus changes. There, we have often held that the role
of appellate courts 'in marking out the limits of [a] standard through the process of
case-by-case adjudication' favors de novo review even when answering a mixed
question primarily involves plunging into a factual record."2 2 1
The Court has at times endorsed this logic even with respect to more purely factual
issues-ones that would seem to be squarely covered by Rule 52's instruction that
"[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous."222 A leading example is Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union,
in which the Supreme Court held that appellate courts must review de novo whether
the defendant in a defamation action made a false statement with "actual malice."223
219. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n ex rel. CW Cap. Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
138 S. Ct. 960, 967 (2018) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561-62 (1988)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 967 n.4 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984)).
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
223. 466 U.S. at 502, 514.
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The Court recognized that this was fundamentally a factual question-whether the
defendant made the statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard for its truth. 224 But it warranted de novo review because the presence of
actual malice was a "First Amendment question[] of 'constitutional fact."' 225
Despite Bose's potentially more generalizable reference to "questions of
constitutional fact,"2 26 there is no blanket rule of de novo appellate review for
findings that implicate constitutional claims or defenses.227 Earlier this year, the
Supreme Court applied a deferential clearly erroneous standard to a host of trial court
findings relevant to the constitutionality of Louisiana's restrictions on abortion
providers.228 And it recently confirmed that a deferential standard of appellate review
applied to a trial court's finding that North Carolina used race as the predominant
factor in drawing two legislative districts in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.229
An additional layer of uncertainty surrounding constitutional issues is whether
any specialized requirement of de novo appellate review applies only
asymmetrically. In the First Amendment context, some circuits hold that de novo
review is required only when the lower court finds speech to be unprotected by the
First Amendment, while ordinary principles of deference govern appellate review
224. See id at 502 (noting that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood "unless he proves that the false 'statement was made with "actual malice"-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not'
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)); see also id at 498 ("It
surely does not stretch the language of the Rule to characterize an inquiry into what a person
knew at a given point in time as a question of 'fact."').
225. Id. at 508 n.27. How courts should treat facts underlying constitutional claims and
defenses is a question that arises in other contexts as well. For example, as Professor Henry
Monaghan has shown, concerns regarding "constitutional fact" review were initially raised
with respect to judicial review of administrative agencies. See Monaghan, supra note 20, at
250-54.
226. Bose, 466 U.S. at 508 n.27.
227. See Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 & n.13 (1983)
(deferring to lower court findings regarding the existence of a "unitary business" for assessing
the constitutionality of a state's taxation of an entity's income and recognizing that "[t]his
approach is, of course, quite different from the one we follow in certain other constitutional
contexts" (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285)).
228. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2132 (2020) (Breyer, J.,
plurality opinion) ("We conclude, in light of the record, that the District Court's significant
factual findings-both as to burdens and as to benefits-have ample evidentiary support. None
is 'clearly erroneous."'); id. at 2141 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("In my view, the District
Court's work reveals no such clear error, for the reasons the plurality explains. The District
Court findings therefore bind us in this case.").
229. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465 (2017) ("[T]he court's findings of fact-
most notably, as to whether racial considerations predominated in drawing district lines-are
subject to review only for clear error."); see also Monaghan, supra note 20, at 266 ("[T]he
Court has declined to exercise independent judgment in the context of schools and voting. In




when the speaker's claim or defense is successful at trial.230 Others, however, reject
this view.231 The Supreme Court has yet to consider this possibility.
Another intriguing category of findings is "legislative facts"23 2 or "social facts." 233
Such facts, unlike findings that are specific to a particular case, are ones that "are
utilized for informing a court's legislative judgment on questions of law and
policy,"2 3 4 or that "'transcend[] the particular dispute,' and provide[] descriptive
information about the world which judges use as foundational 'building blocks' to
form and apply legal rules."235 The Supreme Court alluded to one example of such a
legislative fact in a case where a defendant challenged his conviction on the basis
that potential jurors who opposed the death penalty were excluded from the jury
panel.2 3 6 The federal trial court had granted habeas relief, finding that "'death
qualification' produced juries that 'were more prone to convict' capital defendants
than 'non-death-qualified' juries."2 3 7 Although the Supreme Court did not resolve
the standard of appellate review for such a finding, it recognized such a "legislative
fact" as a category that might be subject to de novo review.238
230. See, e.g., Multimedia Pub. Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154,
160 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The Bose requirement of independent review doesn't apply to the
Commission's claim that it has been wrongly prevented from restricting speech."); Daily
Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the court applies de novo
review "[w]hen a district court holds a restriction on speech constitutional" but clear-error
review "[w]hen the government challenges the district court's holding that the government has
unconstitutionally restricted speech").
231. See, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[T]his Circuit
has applied Bose even when First Amendment claims prevailed below, and thus taken the side
of symmetry."); see also Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981, 981
(1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (noting a circuit split on this issue).
232. See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L.
REv. 1255, 1256 (2012) (citing, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364 (1942)); FED. R. EVID. 201
advisory committee's notes subsection (a).
233. See, e.g., Borgmann, supra note 20, at 1187 (noting that "social facts" are "commonly
referred to as 'legislative' facts").
234. Davis, supra note 232, at 404.
235. Larsen, supra note 232, at 1256-57 (footnote omitted) (quoting David L. Faigman,
"Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 552 (1991)) (quoting Robert E. Keeton,
Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1,
11 (1988)); Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed
Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1988).
236. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986) ("Does the Constitution prohibit the
removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors
whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair
the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial?").
237. Id. at 167 (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1323 (E.D. Ark. 1983)).
238. Id. at 168 n.3 ("Because we do not ultimately base our decision today on the invalidity
of the lower courts' 'factual' findings, we need not decide the 'standard of review' issue. We
are far from persuaded, however, that the 'clearly erroneous' standard of Rule 52(a) applies to
the kind of 'legislative' facts at issue here.").
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Commentators have highlighted other examples of such legislative facts in
important Supreme Court cases: whether racial segregation promotes a sense of
inferiority in Black children that inhibits their learning;239 the rates at which fleeing
from the police in a vehicle causes injuries or fatalities;240 whether violent video
games cause aggression in children;24 1 whether the drug midazolam is likely to
render a person unable to feel pain during an execution;24 2 and whether many women
who obtain abortions come to regret that decision later in their lives,243 to name a
few. The Court has yet to revisit the proper standard of appellate review for
legislative facts,244 and commentators have criticized the Justices' inconsistent
treatment of legislative facts in particular cases.245
This Article's unified approach would not treat either constitutional issues or
legislative facts as separate categories subject to de novo appellate review. As with
all other issues, the appellate court may reverse the trial court with respect to such
issues only when the appellate court can explain why it is more likely to be correct
than the trial court. It would thus resolve the inconsistencies described above. There
would be no need to try to distinguish a finding like "the defendant acted with actual
malice" (which is currently-at least in some sense-subject to de novo review),246
from a finding like "the state used race as the predominant factor in drawing a
legislative district" (which is currently subject to deferential review).24 7 An appellate
court cannot claim pure de novo review over an issue solely because of its
constitutional nature,248 or solely because one premise of the trial court's reasoning
is a "legislative" fact with which the appellate court disagrees.
239. Borgmann, supra note 20, at 1196 (discussing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494-95, 494 n.ll (1954)); see also Larsen, supra note 232, at 1277 (discussing Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 869-77 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
240. Larsen, supra note 232, at 1266 (discussing Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011),
overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)).
241. Borgmann, supra note 20, at 1187 (discussing Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S.
786 (2011)).
242. Yoshino, supra note 20, at 259 (discussing Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739
(2015)).
243. Larsen, supra note 232, at 1257 (discussing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159
(2007)).
244. See Borgmann, supra note 20, at 1188 ("The Court has not revisited the issue since
Lockhart.").
245. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 20, at 258-65.
246. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (discussing Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)).
247. See supra notes 210-13, 229 and accompanying text (discussing Cooper v. Harris,
137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017)).
248. This Article does not explore the extent to which de novo review of certain
constitutional issues may be mandated by the Constitution itself. The Bose decision,
discussed supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text, described its approach to appellate
review of First Amendment issues as "a rule of federal constitutional aw." Bose, 466 U.S. at
510; see also Monaghan, supra note 20, at 229 (observing that Bose required independent
review "as a matter of 'federal constitutional law"'). Naturally, a constitutional requirement




Keep in mind, however, that the appellate court could still assert de novo review
with respect to legal errors.2 4 9 So the appellate court could still independently decide
the ultimate legal questions that legislative facts might inform. This may make the
precise standard of appellate review for legislative facts a less important issue. In
many cases, a particular legal rule does not depend completely on the existence of
certain legislative or social facts; that is, a court may invoke those facts to provide
rhetorical support for the legal rule, but the appellate court would have the power to
adopt that rule for other reasons as well. So depriving appellate courts of de novo
ability to reject a trial court's findings regarding such legislative facts might change
the way appellate opinions are written but not the ultimate legal standards they
declare. To the extent those underlying facts are relevant, however, the same
arguments in favor of a comparative-likelihood-of-correctness tandard apply with
equal force to legislative facts. An appellate court should not displace a trial court's
finding unless it can explain why it is more likely to be correct. Otherwise, we simply
increase the likelihood that the appellate court's legal rules are based on inaccurate
information."'
The Supreme Court's specialized treatment of constitutional issues does,
however, hint at one possible rationale for applying different standards of appellate
review. This rationale does not emerge from the Supreme Court's case law on this
issue, or from the Court's general framework for selecting standards of appellate
review. Rather, it emerges as a way to conceptualize some federal circuits'
endorsement of asymmetric standards of review regarding certain First Amendment
issues. As the next Section will discuss, issue-specific asymmetric review is one
possible solution to the problem of asymmetric error costs.
B. Asymmetric Appellate Review
Neither the Supreme Court's basic framework for selecting standards of appellate
review nor its enigmatic approach to appellate review of certain constitutional issues
acknowledges the possibility of asymmetric appellate review. That is, the Court's
case law does not indicate that the standard of review for a particular issue would
differ depending on which side prevailed on that issue in the trial court. For example,
when it chose the standard of appellate review for Fourth Amendment rulings," it
did not indicate that one standard of review applies when the trial court finds that an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights were violated but a different standard of
review applies when the trial court finds that an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated.
There are some features of appellate practice that do operate asymmetrically,
however. The Double Jeopardy Clause, for example, typically prohibits the
prosecution from appealing a verdict of acquittal,2 but there is no comparable limit
on appeals by defendants convicted at trial. This sort of asymmetry may be a sensible
249. See supra notes 50-51, 147 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 170-84 and accompanying text.
251. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-700 (1996).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) ("[T]he
policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the
Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal.").
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solution to asymmetric error costs. Depending on the issue, an error in one direction
may be more costly than an error in the other direction. That may explain the
asymmetric structure of criminal appeals: as the saying goes, "it is better for ten
guilty people to be set free than for one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned."2 3
One could translate this maxim into economic terms: the erroneous conviction of an
innocent defendant is ten times as costly as the erroneous acquittal of a guilty
defendant.
Asymmetric error costs might affect the optimal approach to standards of
appellate review. We may want to take special steps to avoid errors in one direction,
while being more willing to tolerate errors in another direction. If an error in one
direction is really ten times more costly than an error in the other direction, then
perhaps appellate courts should not apply a single standard of review to a given
issue-whether that standard is this Article's unified approach or the Supreme
Court's current framework for choosing between deferential and de novo review.
We can illustrate this point by incorporating a simplified model of the effects of
the Double Jeopardy Clause into the simplified model used earlier in this Article. As
in the scenarios explored in Part II, assume that the trial court is 90% likely to be
correct, but the appellate court is only 80% likely to be correct.24 For illustrative
purposes, this discussion will model the most extreme form of appellate
asymmetry-a complete ban on appellate review when the trial court acquits a
defendant, and de novo appellate review when the trial court convicts a defendant.5
In cases where the trial court acquits, the result is a correct acquittal 90% of the time
and an incorrect acquittal 10% of the time. In cases where the trial court convicts,
we have the same set of results described in Table 1 above. Table 4 lays out these
results in the context of this specific scenario:
Table 4: De Novo Review of a Trial Court Conviction
Trial court is correct Trial court is incorrect
(90%) (10%)
Box 1: Correct Conviction Box 2: Correct Acquittal
Appellate Appellate court affirms a correct Appellate court reverses an
court is conviction incorrect conviction
correct [72% of cases where the trial court [8% of cases where the trial
(80%) convicts] court convicts]
Box 3: Incorrect Acquittal Box 4: Incorrect Conviction
Appellate Appellate court reverses a correct Appellate court affirms an
court is trial court conviction incorrect conviction
incorrect [18% of cases where the trial court [ 2 % of cases where the trial
(20%) convicts] court convicts]
253. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Justice William O. Douglas, Foreword to JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT
GUILTY 11-12 (1957)); see also Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173,
174-77 (1997) (citing and quoting variations on this maxim).
254. See supra Table 1, notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
255. Obviously, there is a right to a jury trial in criminal cases, see U.S. CONST. amend. VI,
but for simplicity this model assumes a bench trial.
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If we assume for the sake of illustration that half of the trial court cases lead to a
trial court conviction and half lead to a trial court acquittal, then the aggregate results
incorporating the asymmetric approach to appellate review are as follows:
The defendant is correctly acquitted in 49% of all cases. This includes 90% of the
half of cases where the trial court acquits-the correct trial court acquittals that are
not subject to appellate review, which are 45% of all cases (.50 x .90 = .45). And it
includes, from Box 2 above, 8% of the half of cases where the trial court convicts-
those where the appellate court correctly reverses an incorrect trial court conviction,
which are 4% of all cases (.50 x .08 = .04).
The defendant is incorrectly acquitted in 14% of all cases. This includes 10% of
the half of cases where the trial court acquits-the incorrect trial court acquittals that
are not subject to appellate review, which are 5% of all cases (.50 x .10 = .05). And
it includes, from Box 3 above, 18% of the half of cases where the trial court
convicts-those where the appellate court incorrectly reverses a correct trial court
conviction, which are 9% of all cases (.50 x .18 = .09).
The defendant is correctly convicted in 36% of all cases. This is, from Box 1
above, 72% of the half of cases where the trial court convicts-those where the
appellate court correctly affirms a correct trial court conviction (.50 x .72 = .36).
The defendant is incorrectly convicted in 100 of all cases. This is, from Box 4
above, 2% of the half of cases where the trial court convicts-those where the
appellate court incorrectly affirms an incorrect trial court conviction (.50 x .02= .01).
Combining these figures, the accuracy rate for cases that ultimately end in
conviction would be 97.3%; 256 the accuracy rate for cases that ultimately end in
acquittal would be 77.8%;257 and the total accuracy rate across all cases would be
850.2s
These absolute numbers do not have special significance, but when we compare
them to the results in Part II, we can see the relative effect of this sort of asymmetric
appellate review. The accuracy rate for cases that end in conviction (97.3/o) is higher
than the trial court's overall accuracy rate (90%). And it is higher than the optimized
accuracy rate that this Article's comparative-likelihood-of-correctness approach
would reach (91.25%).259 But there would be a significant drop in the accuracy rate
for cases that end in acquittal (77.8%), which is lower than even the appellate court's
overall accuracy rate (80%). And the total accuracy rate of 85% is worse than what
we would achieve by denying appellate review in all cases, which would yield the
trial court's 90% accuracy rate. The model does reveal, however, that asymmetric
appellate review is one way to address asymmetric error costs. If it were, in fact, the
256. Under the results of this model, convictions represent 37% of all cases (36% of all
cases are correct convictions and 1% are incorrect convictions). Within the universe of cases
that end in conviction, 97 .3 % are correct (.36 + .37 = .973) and 2.7% are incorrect (.01 + .37
= .027).
257. Under the results of this model, acquittals represent 63% of all cases (49% of all cases
are correct acquittals and 14% are incorrect acquittals). Within the universe of cases that end
in acquittal, 77.8% are correct (.49 + .63 = .778) and 22.2% are incorrect (.14 + .63 = .222).
258. This is the sum of correct acquittals (49% of all cases) and correct convictions (36%
of all cases).
259. See supra Table 3, note 140 and accompanying text.
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case that an incorrect conviction is ten times as costly as an incorrect acquittal,260 an
economist might welcome the imbalance in accuracy rates that we see in this
model.2 1
By denying appellate review of acquittals, the Double Jeopardy Clause creates an
extreme form of appellate asymmetry. It would also be possible to imagine an
asymmetry merely in the standards of appellate review. This is exactly what occurs
in those federal circuits that embrace asymmetric review of First Amendment
cases-trial court decisions that reject the First Amendment claim or defense are
reviewed de novo, while trial court decisions that rule in favor of the First
Amendment defense receive more deferential review.262 One possible justification
for this asymmetry could be that errors that lead to the mistaken suppression of
speech contrary to the First Amendment are more costly than errors that lead to
overprotection of speech. If so, de novo appellate review of, say, whether a
defamation defendant acted with "actual malice" provides an additional check
against that higher-cost error. As with the simplified criminal example, it can reduce
the likelihood of the higher-cost error-but only at the expense of raising the
likelihood of the lower-cost error.
Given that this Article's proposal is to dispense with issue-by-issue standards of
review, it may seem odd to close with a recognition of a policy rationale in favor of
specialized treatment of certain issues. But recognizing the misguided aspects of the
Court's current approach to standards of appellate review can open space for a more
coherent way to handle issues that do raise a threat of asymmetric error costs. Such
asymmetric error costs may need a particularized solution as a check against the
higher error-cost result.
There are a few ways this Article's proposal could be modified to address
asymmetric error costs. One would be similar to some circuits' asymmetric review
in First Amendment cases. When the trial court reaches the result with the lower cost
of error (say, it rules in favor of the speaker in a case raising First Amendment
issues), the appellate court would apply this Article's unified approach; this Article's
proposal, as discussed above, has hallmarks of deferential review in that it does not
permit pure de novo review.263 But when the trial court reaches the result with the
higher cost of error (say, it rules against the speaker in a case raising First
Amendment issues), the appellate court would apply pure de novo review.
Another possible solution is to incorporate asymmetric burdens of proof for this
Article's proposed inquiry into whether the appellate court is more likely to be
correct than the trial court.264 For example: If the trial court has found that a
defamation defendant is protected from liability by the First Amendment, then the
260. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
261. Under this model, the likelihood of an incorrect conviction is about eight times less
than the likelihood of an incorrect acquittal. See supra notes 256-57 (showing a 2.7% error
rate for convictions and a 22.2% error rate for acquittals).
262. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 170-84 and accompanying text (contrasting this Article's proposal
with an approach that permits pure de novo review).
264. See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of this
Article's proposal); see also supra Part II (arguing that a comparative-likelihood-of-
correctness inquiry maximizes systemic accuracy).
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appellate court should be able to reverse only if the appellate court's likelihood of
correctness is significantly higher than the trial court's likelihood of correctness. If
the trial court has found that a defamation defendant is not protected by the First
Amendment, then the appellate court should be able to reverse unless its likelihood
of correctness is significantly lower than the trial court's likelihood of correctness.
This Article's unified approach would be the presumptive foundation for appellate
review, but issue-specific heightened burdens could be deployed-if necessary-to
address asymmetric error costs.
That said, introducing asymmetries into the appellate process is not the only way
to address asymmetric error costs. For example, we might simply insist on higher
burdens of proof at trial with respect to a particular high-error-cost outcome.265
Evidentiary requirements might also be crafted with an eye toward reducing the
likelihood of higher-cost errors.2 66 The existence of such trial-level adjustments
could make appellate-level adjustments unnecessary; the unified approach to
appellate review proposed in this Article would permit appellate courts to optimally
assess the likelihood that such asymmetric error-reducing requirements were
implemented correctly by the trial court.
Even if one recognizes a need for specialized appellate treatment of certain issues
to account for asymmetric error costs, such exceptions would presumably be quite
narrow. That the Supreme Court has never considered such asymmetric error costs
in connection with its current approach to selecting and applying standards of
appellate review suggests that asymmetric review would be warranted only in the
rarest of circumstances. If such a situation were to arise, however, this Article's
framework would be able to account for such concerns.
CONCLUSION
The standard of appellate review is a threshold question in every appeal. Given
the crucial role that appellate courts play in our judicial system, having a coherent
approach to standards of appellate review is imperative. Although the Supreme Court
has frequently intervened to determine what standard of review should govern
particular trial court rulings, its framework for choosing between de novo and
deferential review is fundamentally flawed.
The key goals of appellate review-error correction and law clarification-are
better served by a uniform template that permits reversal only when (a) the trial court
committed an error of law or (b) the appellate court's likelihood of reaching the
correct decision is higher than the trial court's. This proposal would eliminate the
problematic inquiry into which standard of review should govern which trial court
rulings. Yet, it also minimizes the systemic likelihood of judicial error and enhances
265. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that a criminal conviction
requires "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime"
(emphasis added)); Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) ("When, as
here, the plaintiff is a public figure, he cannot recover unless he proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant published the defamatory statement with actual malice." (emphasis
added)).
266. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. III § 3 ("No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless
on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.").
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the important role that appellate courts play in clarifying the law's substantive
content.

